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PARTIES
Plaintiff, Appellant, Richard E. Gardiner (hereinafter Landlord) has filed an Appellant
Brief through counsel, Todd F. Anderson. The Defendant, Appellee and Cross Appellant,
Nels Anderson (hereinafter Tenant) through counsel, Marlin J. Grant, P.C., hereby submits
this Rebuttal Argument and Cross Appellant Brief.

INTRODUCTION
Landlord sued Tenant for $51,200 in back excess rents collected by Tenant ( between
Oct. 30, 2013 to Oct. 30, 2015), claiming Tenant owed Landlord for lost profits, even though
lj

Tenant paid 100% of the bargained for rents of$1000 due under the contract through Sept.
30, 2015. Landlord also sued for treble damages of $153,600, even after Tenant complied
with Landlord's elected remedy to terminate the lease and seek early possession on
September 3, 2015. Landlord even claimed he had a highly probable success claim and
simultaneously sought pre-judgment writs for $51,200 actual damages and $153,600 in treble
damages, which damage claim again was exclusively for excess rents above the $1000 owed
and not allowed by statute or contract. Tenant answered asserting denials and affirmative

~

defenses and moved the court to stay issuance of any pre-judgment writs. After initial
disclosures, Tenant filed for Summary Dismissal or Summary Judgment, seeking attorney
fees for having to enforce, defend and uphold the contract against Landord's breach, default
and outrageous attempt to seek additional rents not a_llowed while Landlord kept all of
Tenants $2,000 security deposit, that should have been refunded in full.
The Landlord filed a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, claiming Tenant had
- 1-
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breached the lease and was in unlawful detainer and claimed he was entitled to an equitable
remedy for lost profits and excess rents. The Landlord voluntarily dismissed his unjust

~

enrichment claim, but still pursued the contract and unlawful detainer claims.
The Court denied Landlord's request for Cross-Summary Judgment, granted Tenant's
Summary Judgment, but denied Tenant's request for Attorney Fees. However, the Court
awarded Landlord Attorney Fees on Landlord's successful Motion to Strike Tenants Reply
Briefs and Opposition brief (which the Court found were filed late, but well before the Trial
Judge heard oral argument and took the case under advisement).
Tenant was troubled about being ordered to pay Landlord's attorney fees when
nothing egregious, in bad faith or for delay was done by Tenant, yet Landlord acted
aggressively to seek over $153,600 in rents he was not entitled to as a matter of law. Tenant
prevailed 100% on Summary Judgment and was not awarded any fees. Landlord thought he
was still entitled to excess rents and appealed so Tenant filed a cross appeal to undo the
attorney fees awarded to Landlord and obtain attorney fees to Tenant as the only successful
prevailing party.

REBUTTAL STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether the Trial Court correctly and summarily found Tenant was not

subject to excess rents as lost profits to Landlord, either by contract or statute, especially
after Landlord gave Tenant the option to cure or surrender possession. The standard of
review on Summary Judgment Conclusions and Findings are correction of error standard.

Salt Lake County v. Holiday Water Co., 2010 UT. 45, P 14.
-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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2.
1J

Whether the Trial Court erred in awarding Landlord attorney fees on his

Motion to Strike, especially since Tenant did not oppose Landlord's request for extra time
to file Landlords own objection and where the Court found nothing egregious, in bad

~

faith, or intentional delay with Tenants Affidavits, Objection or Reply, and instead held
that the court could find undisputed facts from the two cross motions and agreed upon
exhibits grant Summary Judgment. The standard of Review for pretrial Motions is
generally an abuse of discretion standard, Bodell Construction Co. v. Robins, 2009 UT 52,

1 35, 215 P.3d 933, but awards of attorney fees is generally a correctness standard since
~

this Motion was granted as part of the Summary Judgment Findings. Express Recovery
Services Inc., v. Olson, 2017 UT App 71,
3.

15.

Whether the trial court erred in claiming only Tenant had defaulted under

the Lease but not Landlord where Landlord had sought remedies not allowed by the Lease
or the Unlawful Detainer statute, and after notice from Tenant, wrongfully kept Tenant's
security deposit of $2,000. Summary Judgment findings are reviewed by correction of
error standard. See Salt Lake County v. Holiday Water Company, 2010 UT 45, 114.
4.

Whether the Trial Court misapplied the law on awarding attorney fees to a

prevailing party, the Tenant, for upholding and enforcing the contract in light of
Landlord's aggressive action that was outside the confines of the contra9t remedy or the
statutory remedy, and where Landlord was in breach of the contract himself. The standard
of review on attorney fees is correctness and who is the prevailing party is an abuse of
discretion standard. Express Recovery Services Inc., v. Olson, 2017 UT App 71, 15.
-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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REBUTTAL STATEMENT OF CASE
Nature of Case:

This is a Brief to uphold the trial court summary judgment award to Tenant,
holding that Landlord had no cause of action for excess rents received by Tenant for
subletting, that Tenant had surrendered possession timely at Landlords request and that
was Landlord's sole remedy. This is also a cross appeal brief seeking to overturn the
award of attorney fees to Landlord on his motion to strike while asking the Appellate
Court to award Tenant's motion for attorney fees and costs as the prevailing party in the
summary judgment and on appeal, reversing the decision of the trial court.
Statement of Relevant Facts:

1.

Landlord and Tenant entered into a two year lease, on or about October 30,

2013 for the lease of a warehouse located in the County of Millard, State of Utah, which
lease ended on midnight of October 31, 2015. R. 1, lease exhibit I.
2.

The agreed rent was graduated for $600 first two months; next four months

at $700 a month; May 2014 was $800 a month; and from June 1, 2014 to October 31,
2015 the rent was $1,000 per month. R. 1, paragraph 5-10.
3.

It was undisputed that Tenant was current on rent and was only evicted for

subletting without prior written consent. R. 334, 335.
4.

There was evidence that Tenant notified Landlord by e-mail on October 27,

2014 about a neighbor who suffered a fire and needed to rent space at the Landlord's
warehouse. R. 108. Landlord admitted he received the e-mail in his affidavit of June 24,

-4-
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2017 paragraph 6. R. 155, 334 pg. 6. Landlord further admitted that Todd Anderson was
vj

his agent. See Affidavit in R. 15 5 paragraph 8-9.
5.

Tenant admittedly did sublet part of the warehouse to Liqua-Dry, Inc., but

honored the main lease with Landlord by paying his ongoing rent due and maintaining the
premises. R. 96, paragraph 9-12.
6.

Landlord sent Tenant a default notice dated September 3, 2015 for

subletting and requested (or elected) pursuant to Paragraph 22(8)(3) of the lease to give a
Ten Day Notice to cure the default by paying $30,000 to Landlord or, if no cure, then
Tenant must surrender possession to Landlord and Landlord terminated the lease under
Paragraph 22( c )( 1) of the lease. See R. 1, exhibit 25.
7.

Tenant elected to not cure and stay in the lease, but surrendered possession

timely before September 13, 2015. Landlord admits Tenant surrendered timely. R. 1,
Landlord Complaint paragraph 20.
8.

On September 15, 2015 Landlord sent another letter to Tenant confirming

that Tenant never cured timely and so Landlord elected to terminate the lease and that
~

Tenant must surrender possession of the premises immediately. See R. 1, Landlord's
exhibit 26 to complaint.
9.

Landlord sent Tenant a final letter on November 17, 2015 claiming

Landlord was taking $1,563.89 from Tenant's $2,000 security deposit, but never refunded
Tenant the $2,000 remaining sum, never mentioned the $5000 received from the sub-

-5~
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tenant, and misapplied the $2000 to excess rents claimed that the court never awarded
Landlord. See R. 80 par.23, 192.
10.

Landlord collected the remaining rent from the subtenant and received at

least $2200 for Oct. 2015(R. 155, par.IO) but could have collected $5000, thus covering
all alleged retaking and dispossession costs so Landlord should have refunded 100% of
the $2000 security to Tenant under Paragraph 22.C of the lease.

Nature of Proceedings:
11.

Landlord brought a lawsuit against Tenant on April 5, 2016 seeking excess

rents of $53,100 trebled to $159,300 for unlawful detainer under UCA §78B-6-802 and
attorney fees under §78B-6-811(3); for breach of contract damages of$53,100 and
attorney fees; and alternatively for unjust enrichment (a tort remedy) allegedly for
benefits Tenant received in excess subtenant rents of $53,100 plus attorney fees. R. 1.
12.

Landlord on May 19, 2015 filed for a pre-judgment writ of attachment with

Affidavit, trying to obtain a lien on 3 parcels of land in Tenant's name with a hearing set
for June 13, 2015 in Fillmore Utah (Tenant lives in Malad, Idaho). R.77-80.
13.

Tenant was served all pleadings on May 4, 2016 (R. 74-76) and Tenant

filed an answer on May 24th , 2016 denying default of contract, denying unlawful detainer;
and denying Landlord was entitled to excess rent above the contract rate of $1000 a
month. R. 87.

-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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14.
vj

Tenant filed objections on June I, 20 I 5 to the issuance of any pre-judgment

attachment and placed Landlord on notice of his breach in keeping Tenant's security
deposit. R. I 09.

v,

15.

Tenant filed for summary judgment on June 1, 2016 claiming Tenant was

not in unlawful detainer but had surrendered possession timely; and though there may be
a technical breach by subletting without permission, it never amounted to a default
because Tenant surrendered possession timely in the 10 day window, which was
Landlord's sole remedy. R. 96-108.
~

16.

Landlord filed an Affidavit and Memorandum Opposing the Summary

Judgment on June 24, 2016 (23 days after Tenant filed the Summary Judgment Motion).
R. 155-167 and in footnote 16 voluntarily dismissed his unjust enrichment claim.
17.

Landlord filed a Counter Motion for Summary Judgment against Tenant on

July 6, 2016, attaching another affidavit claiming there were no disputed facts and that
Landlord was entitled to excess rents (above sum of $1,000). R. 168-180.
I 8.

Tenant filed a Reply Supporting Summary Judgment on July 7, 2016. R.

181. Landlord filed to Strike this Reply on July 11, 2016. R. 194.
19.
~

Tenant also filed an objection to Landlord's Motion for Summary Judgment

on July 26, 2016 Gust 20 days after Landlord's filing). R. 286.
20.

Landlord filed a motion to strike Tenant's Reply and Objection on July 28,

2017 (claiming primarily they were untimely even though Tenant's responses were within

-7vi
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7 days and 19 days respectively while Landlord's original objection was filed 27 days
after the Tenants motion for Summary Judgment). R. 291.
21.

The court heard oral argument on the Landlord's motion to strike and the

two summary judgments on October 24, 2016 (R. 332) granting the motion to strike with
attorney fees), then ruled on the Motions for Summary Judgment granting Tenants
Motion in full on December 27, 2016. R. 334.
22.

Landlord sought fees on the Motion to Strike award and was granted

$2,598.75 in fees. R.529.
23.

Tenant sought attorney fees on the summary judgment for about $4,950 and

was denied any fees, although Tenant prevailed 100% against Landlord's Complaint. R.
529.

SUMMARY OF APPELLEES REBUTTAL ARGUMENT
The trial court, based on using the facts even in Landlord's Complaint and prejudgment affidavit of May 19, 2016 and objection atlidavits of June 24, 2016 and July 6,
2016 along with Tenant's Verified Motion for Summary Judgment, was able to find there
were no material disputed facts (despite Landlord's attempt to show the court used facts
from Tenant's Reply and Objection that were stricken). Tenant's verified Motion for
Summary Judgment was granted based on the material facts Landlord already admitted to.
In addition, the court has the liberty in Rule 56( e) to look at undisputed material facts in
the record, whether cited to or not. Rule 56(e) allows the court discretion to consider facts

- 8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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when a party fails to properly address another party's assertion and still enter summary
lfiJ

judgment, which was done in this case.
The court properly looked at the lease, the emails, the affidavits provided by
Landlord and determined, based on those undisputed facts, that it was Landlord's
responsibility to supervise and inspect the premises, that subletting under the lease, even
without permission, allowed landlord to still collect only the $1,000 lease provided for in
the decree and seek early termination of the lease.
Landlord exercised the right under paragraph 22.C.( 1) to terminate the lease early

~

and seek possession. The lease itself provides landlord the right to terminate the lease on
written notice to Lessee and obtain possession and only those damages necessary to
recover the premises, reasonably attorney fees to evict (if Lessee refuses to surrender) and
rents up to the value of the Lease payments equivalent to what the Lessee owes (i.e.,
$1,000) if Lessee or subtenant paid under the $1000 for the remaining term. Here,

l@

Sublessee paid $2200 for Oct. 2015 so nothing was owed by Lessee.
The lease had a built in mitigation clause that Lessor must, if he takes back
l(i)

possession, first apply the sub lessee's rental payments to cost to dispossess the Lessee and
then pay the $1000 lease rent due under the lease. Thus, Lessor obtained the $1000 rent

vi

due plus $1200 to any claims on toilet and wiring repairs. Lessor could have enforced
payment of $5000 rents for Oct. 2015 from sub lessee, but elected not to. Lessee was
liable only if Landlord was not able to cover the rent owed in the lease from sublessee, so

-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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all $2000 of Tenants security deposit should have been refunded. See lease paragraph
23.C.(1) and(4). There were no other damages for the retaking.
The unlawful detainer statute and case law only allows the Landlord to seek
damages from the tenant for "unlawful detainer" after giving proper notice and then only
if tenant fails to surrender timely. See UCA §78B-6-801(9). Tenant in this case was never
in unlawful detainer, surrendered as Landlord asked timely and Landlord took possession
and all sublessee's payments covered the remaining rent and dispossession fees under the
lease. Landlord could not sue Tenant for unlawful detainer.
Lastly, the court erred in punishing Tenant by awarding Landlord's attorney fees
on the Motion to Strike since Tenant did nothing egregious to warrant such an order. Rule
56(h) allows the court to award attorney fees only if the declaration is submitted in bad
faith or solely for delay. There was no finding of bad faith or delay. The court did not
even hear the Summary Judgment motion until October 24, 2016 and then used the
available undisputed facts to grant Tenant Summary Judgment, claiming the Tenant's
responses only took extra time to review by Landlord, but that it was harmless. The court
exceeded its discretion and the order of fees must be reversed and attorney fees awarded
to the proper party, the Tenant, who was the prevailing party herein.

SUMMARY OF CROSS APPELLANTS ARGUMENT
The Lessee in this case was required to defend against an improper action for
excess rent above that due under the lease by filing an Answer, Objection to Pre-judgment
Writ of Attachment, and seeking Summary Judgment to avoid the treble damages of over
- 10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

$153,600 and improper taking of $2000 security deposit. Landlord's election to terminate
~

and take early possession through Lessee's surrender was the only remedy available and
since Lessee elected not to cure but surrender, Lessor received the elected remedy under
the lease.
It was a breach of the lease terms for Lessor to sue for more outside the lease or

statute, seek prejudgment writs and attorney fees, when no damages had been committed.
Lessor was in breach for not returning the Lessee's security deposit of $2000. It was error
for the court to not award Tenant all his attorney fees to defend against Landlord's
~

improper Complaint and bad faith action.
Tenant was entitled to attorney fees under Paragraph 23 to enforce the contract
against the defaulting Lessor; as well as under paragraph 22.C.{l), for reciprocal attorney
fees to Lessee for Lessor's wrongful attempt to seek more rents than were due under that
paragraph. Because paragraph 22.C.( I) only gave Lessor attorney fees for not
surrendering, the reciprocal statute creates equity to Lessee to likewise obtain his fees to
defend against the improper action after Lessee timely and properly surrendered under

~

that clause. In addition, although the Unlawful Detainer Statute originally only awarded
fees to a successful Lessor under UCA §78-6-811(3), said statute was later changed,
showing the legislative intent when a Tenant prevails in defending against unlawful
detainer actions, rewarding the "prevailing party" attorney fees. By equity, justice, and
fairness, Tenant should have been awarded all his attorney fees since he prevailed 100%

~

against Landlord.
- 11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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APP ELLE ES
REBUTTAL ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT PROPERLY FOUND NO MATERIAL DISPUTES AND GRANTED
SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO TENANT.
Landlord spends most of his brief arguing about whether the Court looked at
Tenant's Verified facts after the Motions to Strike were granted rather than on the actual
facts supporting summary judgment which come primarily from Landlord's own
affidavits. The Court has authority and discretion in UR of CP, Rule 56(e)(3), when
affidavits may not properly address another parties assertions, to "grant summary
judgment if the motion and supporting materials including facts considered undisputed
show the moving party is entitled to it. ... " Tenant was entitled to summary judgment after
the court, "on its own .. .identi[fied] for the parties material facts that may not be
genuinely in dispute." Rule 56(/)(3).
Tenant has placed those undisputed material facts in this brief above so the court
has the necessary facts, cited to the record, showing all of these facts came from admitted
documents, emails, and Landlord's own affidavits. The trial court did not make any errors
in finding no material disputed facts in this case.
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POINT II
THE COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT LANDLORD HAD A REMEDY TO
TERMINATE THE LEASE EARLY AND SEEK POSSESSION, BUT NOTHING
MORE WHERE TENANT TIMELY SURRENDERED POSSESSION TO
LANDLORD, WAS NOT IN DEFAULT ON RENTS, AND WHERE SUBLESSEE
PAID MORE TO LANDLORD THAN THE RENT TENANT OWED LANDLORD
UNDER THE LEASE OF $1000 A MONTH FOR THE REMAINING TERM.

Landlord's argument that if there was a contract breach by Tenant that Landlord is
@

entitled to contract money damages is true only if the contract provides for money
damages of lost profits or if the statute allowed for such. In this case, upon a default for
subletting, the lease stated Tenant remained responsible for the reserved rents and
provided the remedy of early contract termination and repossession to the Landlord,
which Landlord elected under paragraph 22.C, without incurring any money damages to
dispossess the Tenant. Moreover, Tenant was not in unlawful detainer so none of the
damages in the Unlawful detainer statute apply.
Landlord elected the contract remedy of early contract termination
and possession of the lease and no contract remedy existed for excess rents above
$1000 a month {but only the difference between Oto $1000). The remedies and terms
in the contract are binding on the parties.

Landlord granted Tenant two years possession and quiet enjoyment to the
warehouse for $1000.00 a month rent. See Para. 1-3 and 16 of the Lease. Tenant was not
to sublet without Landlord's prior written consent (but if Tenant did sublet without
permission)"regardless of any such ... sublease, Lessee shall remain primarily liable for
the payment of the rent herein reserved ... " Para 4 of Lease. Lessor or his agent retained
the right to enter the demised premises at any reasonable time upon notice to Lessee, to
- 13 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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examine the same ... " Para 8 of Lease. Landlord or his agent, Todd Anderson, could have
entered whenever they wished to examine the status of the property. Tenant/Lessee
accepted the premises and remained responsible for all utilities and maintenance during
the lease tenn. Para 5-7, 9-12, 14-15.
The remedies for a default were clearly set forth in the paragraphs 22 to 28
of the lease. For instance, Landlord claimed Tenant failed to obtain written permission to
sublease under para. 4 of the lease. Para 22.B defines an "event of default" as:

"(3) Failure by Lessee to perform any other provision of this lease required of
Lessee, if the failure to perform the same is not cured within 10 days after written

notice has been given to Lessee."
Para. 22.C.(1) gave Landlord remedies for "an event of default" that was not cured
in 10 days:

(1)
"Lessor shall have the immediate right. .. to terminate this lease .... ",
and Lessor " ... may recover from Lessee all damages Lessor may incur by
reason of Lessee's breach, including cost of recovering the premises,
reasonable attorney's fees and the worth at the time of such tennination of the
excess, if any, of the amount of rent and charges equivalent to rent reserved in
this lease ($1,000 a month) for the remainder of the stated term over the then
reasonable rental value of the premises for the remainder of the stated
term ... " 1

22.C.(4) makes it clear if Lessor retakes the premises and sublets to Sublessee that
Lessee remains liable to Lessor only for costs of dispossessing Lessee and for costs of

1 Note Landlord actually obtained at least $2,200 and could have rec~ived $5,000 a month from sublessee over the
remaining term (September 30, 2015 to October 30, 2015) and since there were no unpaid rents by Tenant or costs to
dispossess or relet, there were no damages. Tenant turned the premises back, vacated early, as required within I 0
days of the notice.
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reletting the premises and any shortage of rents collected from Sub lessee below the
$1,000 rent due from Lessee for the remaining lease term.

2

Landlord's own notice sent to Tenant on September 3, 2015 (exhibit 25 to
Complaint) stated that Tenant could elect one of two conditions:
1.

Cure the default by paying Landlord $30,000 and removing Liqua-Dry Inc.,
from the premises within 10 days of September 3, 2015; or

2.

Landlord will terminate the lease under paragraph 22.(C).(l) and Tenant
must surrender possession of the premises in 10 days.

See also Landlord's notice of termination dated September 15, 2015 as exhibit 26
to Complaint where Landlord clearly defined to Tenant that Landlord elected the
remedy to terminate the Lease under paragraph 22.C.(l) and for Lessee to surrender
possession.
Tenant did surrender possession to Landlord by September 13, 2015 and this was
~

never disputed. The only damages Landlord was entitled to were those listed in the
November 17, 2015 letter to Tenant of $1,563 taken from Tenant's $2,000 security

~

deposit to repair the toilet and electrical units. However, Landlord was required to
mitigate losses under Para. 22.C.(4) by applying excess subtenant rent above the $1000 to
the re letting fees and should have refunded all of Tenants $2000 security deposit.
Thus, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to Tenant, determining
Landlord's only contract remedy was early termination and possession as allowed in

2. Note, Landlord elected to terminate the Lease, incurred no costs to dispossess Lessee and no costs to relet the
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the Lease paragraph 22.C.(l) elected by Landlord and pursuant to UCA §78B-68 l l (l )(c) & (d) (forfeiture oflease).

2.
The court properly granted Tenant summary judgment under the
unlawful detainer action because Tenant was never in "unlawful detainer after
notice" from Landlord.
To be in unlawful detainer and receive damages allowed in the statute (UCA §
78B-6-81 l) or even under the lease, Landlord must first give notice to Tenant of the
breach and Tenant must remain in possession, refusing to vacate the premises, forcing
Landlord to seek court ordered forfeiture and restitution. Tenant did not remain in
possession after Landlord demanded cure or surrender by sending notice on September 3,
2015, but Tenant timely vacated and surrendered the premises' to Landlord (undisputed).
See also 78B-6-802( I) where a tenant is guilty of an unlawful detainer if the
tenant:
(a) ... "continues in possession";
(b) (i) "continues in possession";
(ii) "remains in possession";
(c) "continues in possession .. .after a notice in writing requiring ... surrender of the
detained premises ... "
(d) " ... sublets the leased premises ... after service of a three calendar days' notice
to quit";
(e) "sets up or carries on any unlawful business ... after service of a three calendar
days' notice to quit";
(g) commits a criminal act. .. and remains in premises after service of a three
calendar days' notice to quit".
(h) continues in possession ... after notice in writing ... surrender ... and remains
un-complied with for three calendar days' after service".

premises since Liqua-Dry was in possession and paying $5,000 a month rents by written contract to Oct. 31, 2015.
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Clearly, to be in unlawful detainer the tenant must remain in possession until after
the notice to quit before the landlord may seek unlawful detainer. The whole unlawful
detainer statute is for a "summary remedy to recover possession" of their property from
tenants who may be in violation of a lease provision. Buchanan v. Crites, I 06 Utah 428,
150 P.2d 100, 108 (1944).

Landlord contends that subletting without written permission is a breach and
Landlord should be granted all excess profits that Tenant received from the sublease
above $1,000 rent due back to the first default by Tenant. Notice the Lease contract does
not make Tenant's actions an "event of default" until Landlord gives Tenant a 10 day
written notice to cure or surrender. See Paragraph 22.B.(3) of lease. The unlawful
detainer statute similarly provides in 78B-6-801 (9) "uf1:lawful detainer" means unlawfully
remaining in possession of property after receiving a notice to quit, served as required

by this chapter, and failing to comply with that notice."
The trial court held specifically as follows:

~

Tenant clearly complied with Landlord's notice of September 3 and September
14, 2015 and vacated and surrendered possession. UCA § 78B-6-802(1)(d)
provides a tenant is guilty of an unlawful detainer if the tenant:
"( d) assigns or sublets the Leased premises contrary to the covenants of the
Lease ... after service of a three calendar days' notice to quit" 3
Landlord argues that in Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-6-802(l)(d), the comma
separating the phrase "assigns or sublets the leased premises contrary to the
covenants of the lease" from the following phrase indicates that the phrase
"after service of a three calendar days' notice to quit" modifies only the phrase
3. Note, UCA §788-6-802(2) allows, the tenant or subtenant after the service ofnotice to quit to cure or to perform
the covenant of the Lease and save it from forfeiture. These provision read in connection with the Lease notice in
22.B.(3) required service of notice on tenant before any default or unlawful detainer could arise.
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"commits or permits waste on the premises." Accordingly, Landlord contends
that no notice is required by the unlawful detainer statute for an action for
subletting the leased premises contrary to the covenants of the lease.
The Court held that it was not persuaded by Landlords argument. Courts are
"to interpret the provisions of a statute in hannony with other statutes in the
same chapter and related chapters." State v. J.MS. 2011 UT 75,,..., 22,280 P.3d
410 (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, courts should seek to
avoid interpretations "which render some part of a provision nonsensical or
absurd." O'Dea v. Olea, 2009 UT 46,,..., 32, 217 P.3d 704 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Here, aside from a comma, the Court does not find anything
within the unlawful detainer statute which would indicate that unauthorized
subletting somehow supersedes the notice provisions contained therein or that
the legislature intended for a party to be in unlawful detainer (and subject to
the punitive nature of treble damages such as those requested by Landlord in
this matter) without notice. Such an interpretation would render the notice
requirements for all other unlawful detainer actions nonsensical or absurd.
Accordingly, the Court declines to find Tenant in unlawful detainer prior to
notice having been given by Landlord.
The court correctly held Tenant was not in unlawful detainer and Landlord could
not seek the excess rents Tenant obtained above the $1,000 rent due under the lease, since
Tenant surrendered and Landlord obtained sufficient rents from sub-lessee from the date
of notice forward to end of the lease term to cover all Landlord's alleged losses.
3.
The Landlord cannot seek lost profits as damages for excess rents
received from a subtenant under the law when Tenant complied with the lease and
was not in unlawful detainer.

Unlawful detainer is a statutory action for damages for breach of lease or nonpayment of rent, but a tenant cannot be in unlawful detainer if they have paid all their rent
4v

due under the lease and surrender possession before the date they are given notice to
leave. For instance, UCA §78B-6-801 (9) defines "unlawful detainer" to "mean[ s]
unlawfully remaining in possession of property after receiving a notice to quit, served as
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required ·by this chapter, and failing to comply with that notice."
Tenant was in lawful possession. Landlord obtained possession early, after Tenant
timely left, so there is no wrongful detainer. Landlord has wrongfully sued for back
profits, retroactive to December 2013, way before the notice to quit was sent on Sept. 3,
2015, and sought excess rents above $1,000 retroactive for 23 months, all before the
notice to quit was even served. This is not allowed under the statute, under the lease, or
in common law, and is frivolous and bad faith action by Landlord.
In Aris Vision Institute Inc. v. Wasatch Property Management, Inc., 2006 UT 45

118 143 P.3d 278, the court discussed proper damages and held:

vb

"The statute specifies only that the damages must be 'resulting' from ... (b)
forcible or wrongful detainer, or (c) waste of premises."
"This court has held that "damages ... are measured by the rule that they must
be natural and proximate consequences of the acts complained of and nothing
more. In other words, the damages must be directly traceable to the forcible
entry, forcible or unlawful detainer, or that waste was committed by the
Tenant's." Id. at 119.
Here, UCA § 78B-6-81 l(l)(d) clearly requires Landlord to mitigate damages and
subparagraph (2) only allows assessment of damages" resulting to Landlord from ... :
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer;
(c) waste of the premises during the Tenant's tenancy, if waste is alleged in the
complaint and proved at trial;
(d) the amounts due under contract; ... "
Tenant owed nothing under the contract, paid the $1000 due each month, and
committed no waste. Tenant was not in unlawful detainer so there were no "resulting
damages".
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The basis of a suit in unlawful detainer is unlawful possession." Carstensen v.
Hansen, 107 Utah 234, 152 P.2d 954, 955 (1944). "Because the unlawful detainer statute
applies only in cases where an owner of property is unlawfully deprived of possession,
the touchstone for availability of unlawful detainer proceedings is the unlawful
possession of property". Osguthorpe v. Wolf National Resorts LC., 232 P.3d 999, 1006,
2010 UT 29, ~24; Bichler v. P.E.T. Sys., Inc., 2009 UT 63, ~29, 220 P.3d 1203.
Moreover, Landlord is deemed to waive the right to seek excess rents from Tenant
by failing to inspect and file the notice to quit for subletting when Landlord learned of it
(Todd Anderson is Landlord's agent, also lawyer for Liqua-Dri, Inc., knew of the
sublease and notice to agent is imputed to principal). See email of Oct. 27, 2014 as well in
addendum 3. Landlord waived any right, after email notice, that Tenant planned to sublet
to another in October 2014.
Also, by accepting rents from Tenant of $1,000 Landlord likewise waived seeking
excess rents. In Jensen v. OK Investments Corp., 29 Utah 2.d 231, 507 P.2d 713 (Utah
1973), the court held at page 717: .
"In Kinter v. Harr, the court stated that a covenant in a lease prohibiting
assignment without written approval of the lessor (same as subletting) is for
the benefit of the Lessor and may be waived by accepting rent from the
assignee (or tenant) and permitting him to remain in possession. The
conduct of Landlords over the period of years in which Dan's remained in
possession, particularly after they received written notification that the option
to renew was being exercised and they accepted the ... rental payment,
constituted a waiver of their right to demand a forfeiture for breach of the
condition against assignment without written consent."
Landlord accepted all Tenants rent from November 2013 to September 2015,
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~

which constitutes a waiver of Landlord's right to seek default or breach of the subletting
~

provision. Even the lease only allows Landlord to seek the rent reserved therein. See para.
4 of lease.
Additionally, Landlord cannot assert unjust enrichment since it exists only "when
there is neither an actual nor an implied contract between the parties. "Jones v. Mackay
Price Thompson and Ostler, 355 P.3d 1000, 2015 UT 60, ,I44. Further, "A Tenant is

VI

liable under the unjust enrichment prong of quantum merit only if he or she received a
direct benefit from the Landlord. In other words unjust enrichment does not result if the
~

Tenant has received only an incidental benefit from Landlord's services." Id. at ,I65.
Landlord dismissed this claim voluntarily.
Landlord's claim that Utah permits excess rents or lost profits for a lease breach is
misguided and unsupported in the law. Landlord claims TruGreen Cos., LLC, v. Mower
Brothers, 2008 UT 81, 199 P.3d 92 allows for an excess profits claim. However,
TruGreen dealt with the unusual issue of employees breaching a non-compete clause with
the damages that flow to the employer from such. There, the employee actually leaves a

vi)

damage hole to fill because the employer lost a servant and then losses potential business
by the employee taking employers clients. Here, the landlord never lost his main tenant

~

and kept the lease rents of $1000. There was no hole. Nor did the lease have an anticompete clause and no excess loss clause had been drafted. As stated in TruGreen at 1
18-19:
,Il 8 By holding that lost profits is the appropriate measure of damages in suits
concerning breaches of covenants not to compete, disclose, or solicit, we are
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also holding that restitution or unjust enrichment is not an appropriate
measurement in these actions. As we have stated previously, restitution and
unjust enrichment are remedies found in quantum merit. Emergency Physicians
Integrated Care v. Salt Lake County, 2007 UT 72, 1 10, 167 P.3d 1080. As
tools of equity, they are used only when no express contract is present. Am.
Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCI Mech., Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1193 (Utah 1996);
see also Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 268-70 (Utah Ct.App.1987)
(discussing quantum merit as a tool to be used in equity actions).
119 Additionally, as a policy matter, we do not wish to adopt a remedy for
breach of contract that punishes the breaching party. Rather, our focus is
on placing "the non-breaching party in as good a position as if the
contract had been performed." Anesthesiologists Assocs. v. St. Benedict's
Hosp., 884 P.2d 1236, 1238 (Utah 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Contract law is amoral and, therefore, appropriate in a business setting in
which efficiency is valued. See Marcus, Stowell & Beye Gov't Secs., Inc. v.
Jefferson Inv. Corp., 797 F.2d 227, 232 (5th Cir.1986) (discussing the
appropriateness of efficient breaches of contract); Lake River Corp. v.
Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1289 (7th Cir.1985) (discussing how
efficient breaches are socially beneficial since both parties are either in the
same or better position than they would have been if the contract had been
performed). We have also held that punitive damages for breach of contract, by
themselves, are inappropriate "even if intentional and unjustified." Hal Taylor
Assocs. v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 750 (Utah 1982). "[S]uch
damages are [only] allowable if there is some independent tort indicating
malice, fraud or wanton disregard for the rights of others." Id. Thus, we
confirm our earlier holdings that any measure of damages that punishes a
breaching party is inappropriate.

Landlord is not contractually entitled to more damages since Paragraph 4 of the
lease states, even after subletting without written permission, that "Lessee shall remain
primarily liable for the payment of the rent herein reserved .... " Landlord drafted the
contract and it is construed against Landlord seeking excess profits. See Paragraph
22.C.(l) and (4). Landlord's breach of contract claim was fully satisfied by the payment
of $1000 rent to Oct. 30, 2015 and early possession taken by Landlord. Additionally,
Landlord can make no claim for triple rents or damages under the Unlawful Detainer
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Statute because Tenant was never in unlawful detainer.
POINT III
THE COURT ABUSED HER DISCRETION BY ORDERING TENANT TO PAY
LANDLORD'S ATTORNEY FEES

The trial court committed an abuse of discretion by granting Landlord's attorney fees
on the Landlord's Motions to Strike the Tenant's pleadings. UR of CP, Rule 7(e) provides
vi)

the mechanism for filing supporting replies, objections and the like, which are supplemented
by Rule 56 in Motions for Summary Judgment. The Rules .of Civil Procedure are not to be
construed so dogmatically that justice is abused. Rule 56 supplements Rule 7 procedures and
provides the court considerable discretion in Rule56( e) to consider facts that are undisputed
or grant the party an opportunity to properly support or address the facts. Additionally, Rule
56(h) states:

"If satisfied that an affidavit or declaration under this rule is submitted in bad
faith or solely for delay, the court-after notice and a reasonable time to
respond-may order the submitting party to pay the other party the reasonable
expenses, including attorney's fees, it incurred a_s a result."
There was no finding of bad faith or delay and if anything, the responses were proper, just a
~

little late, but did not harm Landlord since the court did not even use the responses to grant
Summary Judgment nearly 5 months later. Moreover, Tenant was never given notice and
reasonable time to correct any affidavits submitted, so how could Landlord get fees in the
first place?
The court should not overstep it's authority and sanction the moving party with costs
and attorney fees where Summary Judgment could be granted even without looking at the
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Tenant's Reply or Objection, showing how unmeritorious Landlord's claims actually were.
Such sanctions should be reserved "to control the 'conduct of attorneys and litigants' who.se
'actions interfered with the administration ofjustice and resulted in wasted time and effort by
opposing counsel' ", not late filings that harmed no one. See generally Maxwell v. Woodall,
2014 UT App 125,,I 7, 328 P.3d 869.

If anything, Tenant's entire motion for Summary Judgment helped avoid more wasted
effort and litigation over Landlord's unmeritorious case. The responses were not egregiously
th

filed to delay the case but to speed it along. It just happened that July 4 and July 24

th

happened around the briefing and Tenant could not supply the briefs timely. Tenant had

~

allowed Landlord extra time to file his Objection to Tenant's Summary Judgment Motion, so
Tenant thought Landlord would not mind. However, Landlord took a hard line approach
seeking to strike Tenants Objection and Response hoping apparently for an advantage. The
trial court actually ruled:
"However, in that there are cross motions for summary judgment, the Court
does find that Landlord's Motion for Summary Judgment is opposed by Tenant
and will consider the arguments and material from Tenant's Motion to Dismiss
or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment filed on June 1, 2016.
The Courts time was not wasted since normally the court reviews the Pleadings and
facts, the law and arguments before making the decision anyway. Apparently time was saved
by just reviewing the Tenant's initial Motion for Summary Judgment. The actual decision
was not entered until December 27, 2016, nearly 4 months after briefing was concluded.
Thus, it was more punitive to award the attorney fees to Landlord and amounts to an abuse of
discretion.
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CROSS APPELLANTS ARGUMENT
POINT I
LANDLORD WAS IN GREATER BREACH AND DEFAULT UNDER THE
LEASE THAN TENANT

The trial court initially held that Tenant was in breach for subletting without
i,ifJ

written permission, even though Tenant timely surrendered in the 10 day notice window.
An event of Default occurs only if, after the 10 day notice in Para. 22.B.(3) is given, that
Tenant refuses to surrender. The court found that Tenant was not in unlawful detainer so
there was no actual default by Tenant. In other words, the breach was harmless and
waived by Landlord in large degree and never became an "event of default".
However, the Landlord was in breach for going against the damages allowed in
Paragraph 22.C.(l) and (4) of the lease, for misapplying the mitigation rents, by seeking

~

retroactive excess rents, not due under the lease, in the sum of over $51,200. Landlord
had also collected at least $2200 in rents from the sub-lessee but could have obtained
$5000 from the sub-lessee in October 2015. Landlord, despite obtaining all these excess
funds still forfeited Tenant's $2000 security deposit, failing to apply the excess sub-tenant
rent to the $1563 in re-letting losses.
Paragraph 22.C.(4) requires Lessor to mitigate the losses by stating:
"in the event of such subletting (by Lessee and where Lessor takes
possession) Lessor shall have the right to collect any rent which may
become payable under the sublease(i.e., the $5000 due for Oct. 2015) and
apply the same first to the payment of expenses incurred by Lessor in
dispossessing Lessee, and in re-letting, the premises, and, thereafter, to the
- 25 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

payment of rent herein required to be paid by Lessee( $1000 for Oct.
2015) .... "
Taking this fonnula, Lessor claimed he incurred $1563 .89 in expenses of re-letting
the property, such as fixing the toilet and wiring. Lessor received or could have required
subtenant to pay the $5000 due that subtenant owed for Oct. 2015. Lessor must apply this
rent first to the expenses ($1563.89) and then to Lessee's obligation of $1000 for Oct.
2015. This application of rents to mitigate would still give Landlord $2436.11 in excess
profits! Landlord was in default for keeping Tenants $2000 in security deposits and not
returning it when asked by Tenant in the Pleadings from Tenant.
It was error for the court to not hold Landlord in default, especially after Tenant
had notified Landlord of these breaches in Tenant's various pleadings and motions and
Landlord refused to cure them. See paragraph 22.B.(3) that creates an "event of default"
after notice and failure to cure within ten days. Tenant even asked the trial judge to award
Tenant these costs and she told Landlord to work it out with Tenant outside of the
summary judgment, hopefully without further litigation.
Landlord's filing for damages in an unmeritorious manner, against the provisions
of the lease, is a default. Certainly keeping all of the security deposit when the excess
subtenant's rents paid all damages is a default. Otherwise, Tenant is on unequal playing
ground under the contract, leaving Tenant without recourse for Landlords conduct. This
was error. The reciprocal statute was enacted to prevent such inequality in contracts and
attorney fees should have been granted under that provision alone.
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POINT II
TENANT WAS ENTITLED TO AN A WARD OF ATTORNEY FEES UNDER THE
LEASE FOR DEFENDING THE LEASE AND FOR LANDLORD'S DEFAULT
OR FOR STATUTORY FEES IN EQUITY.

The court argued that Tenant was not entitled to attorney fees under paragraph 23
unless Landlord was in default, Holding only Tenant was in default and not Landlord,
ignoring Landlord's breaches and defaults as argued above. The court ignored the
Reciprocal Attorney Fee Statute and the one sided provision in paragraph 22.C.(l) of the
lease that awards "reasonable attorney's fees" solely to Lessor for having to recover the
~

premises, but no attorney fees to Lessee for successfully defending against Lessor's
improper pursuit of excess rents under that same paragraph.
The court said the attorney fees in the unlawful detainer statute are awardable only
to a landlord citing the 2016 version ofUCA .§.78B-6-811(3) even though the provision
was changed by the legislators in 2017 to award fees to the "prevailing party". The court
said the statute could not apply retroactively to when this breach occurred.
The trial court went to great lengths to avoid awarding fees to Tenant for

\$

prevailing. It was as if the trial court looked for any reason not to award fees to Tenant
rather than finding that contract attorney fees must be awarded. The court abused her
discretion and this court must correct the error in justice and fairness.
1.
Landlord owes fees under either paragraph 22.C.(1) for reciprocal fees,
or directly under paragraph 23 for prevailing since Landlord was in default under
two maior lease provisions.

The recent case of Express Recovery Services, Inc., v. Olson, 2017 UT App 71
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(April 27, 2017) is on point and makes the holding that:

"If the legal right to attorney fees is established by contract, Utah law clearly
requires the court to apply the contractual attorney fee provision and to do so
strictly in accordance with the contracts tenns .... Since the right is contractual,
the court does not possess the same discretion to deny attorney fees that it has
when fashioning equitable remedies, or applying a statute which allows for the
discretionary award of such fees" Id., 18 .. .. "Ultimately, the focus should be
on 'which party had attained a comparative victory, considering what a total
victory would have meant for each party and what a true draw would look
like ... Comparative victory-not necessarily a shutout-is all that is required"
Id., 1 JO.
Based on this case, Tenant is entitled to all his attorney fees under the contract for
successfully defending against the Lessors failed attempt to get excess rents under
paragraph 22.C.(l) ( which only grants fees to the Lessor) so the reciprocal fees in UCA
§78B-5-826 should have applied. Defending and upholding a lease provision has been
deemed "prevailing" under the contract so that attorney fees are awardable to the
prevailing party. Tenant would add that Chase v. Scott, 2001 UT App. 404, 116-17, 38
P. 3d 1001 allows an award for costs and for attorney fees under contract provisions to

defend against a breach of contract action, since the reciprocal provisions in UCA §78B5-826 allow for such and "litigation ... to enforce" the contract includes a successful
defense under the contract. See also Rappaport v. Four Lake Village HOA Inc., 2013 UT,
App 78, ,I25, 300 P.3d 327 which states attorney fees are awardable to defend against

Plaintiffs actions to rescind a contract as a matter of common sense.
Clearly the reciprocal statute "provides that a court may award costs and attorney
fees in a civil action if two main conditions are met. First, the civil action must be 'based
upon any promissory note, written contract, or other writing.' And second, 'the provisions
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of the promissory note, written contract, or other writing' must allow at least one party to
~

recover attorney fees. Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, 112 to 16, 160 P.3d 1041 and
UCA §78B-5-826. The reciprocal statute "seeks to remedy the exposure to uneven
litigation risks created by contractual provisions". Id., at footnote 6. In that case, attorney
fees were awarded to Bilanzich under a warranty that never was binding against Bilanzich
but because the contract was at least binding on Lonetti (i.e., one of the parties), so that
Bilanzich was entitled to attorney fees for defending against the invalid claim brought by
Lonetti.
Likewise, because there is a writing and the writing allows at least the Landlord
attorney fees in Para. 22.C( 1) and 24 (the lease contract provisions awards reasonable

4fH

attorney fees to Landlord against Tenants to seek surrender and termination of the lease
for tenant's default), then the reciprocal statute allows the court to likewise award
attorney fees to tenant for successfully defending against Landlord's meritless attack
where Landlord could not and was not awarded damages for seeking excess rents of
$51,200. See Hooban v. Unicity Int'!, Inc., 2012 UT 40131-32, 285 P.3d 766 (holding
that Utah's reciprocal fee statute mandated an attorney fee award to a Tenant pursuant to
a contract provision even when that Tenant successfully showed that it was not even a
party to the contract).
If fees are not awardable under paragraph 22.C. then they should be awarded under
paragraph 23 for prevailing on Summary Judgment against Landlord's clear defaults. The
court has no discretion to not award Tenant his fees under this contract, which even under
- 29 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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a strict interpretation, allowed Tenant attorney fees in this case. Paragraph 23 is also
worded in such a way as to allow fees for defending or enforcing the contract and
specifically states:
"Should either party default in the performance of any covenants or
agreements contained herein, such defaulting party should pay to the other
party all costs ... , including ... reasonable attorney fees ... which the prevailing
party may incur in enforcing this Agreement. .. "
This can be read to say if Landlord brings an action for default against Tenant but
Tenant is successful in defending against the default and prevails in enforcing the
contract, then Tenant as prevailing party can be awarded fees as well since Landlord is
failing to abide by the terms and covenants in the lease.
See also Airport Park Salt Lake City LP. Vs. 42 Hotel SLC, LLC, 2016, UT App.
137, 378 P.3d 117 (where court reversed the trial court decision that neither party

prevailed or no contractual right existed for an awarded of attorney fees and remanded to
trial court to determine who prevailed to see if Hotel was to be awarded attorney fees
under the easement). The court tries to award fees in such cases to be fair to those
innocently caught in the cross hairs of Plaintiff.

2.
Landlord likewise would owe attorney fees to Tenant under the various
statutes of UCA§ 57-17-5, §78B-6-811(3) , or UCA §78B-5-825 for filing an
unmeritorious claim that was dismissed on summary iudgment, showing it lacked
any merit and was flied primarily to punish Tenant, thus making it a bad faith
filing.
The statute in the residential security refund area should apply to the commercial
contracts by analogy since the lease itself allowed for cumulative remedies whether
allowed in law or equity. See Paragraph 22.D. Security provisions in the Commercial or
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Residential context are the same, or so similar that in equity the fee provision should .

~

apply. Failure by landlords to return security deposits has been a problem and it is
difficult to collect the refund unless attorney fee sanctions attach. The provision in UCA §
57-17-5 states:

"If an owner or the owners agent fails to comply with the requirements in
Subsection 57-17-3(5)(basically fails within 30 days after termination of the
tenancy or within 15 days after receipt of the renter's new mailing address,
whichever is later, to provide the renter the notice required giving an itemized
list of deductions), the renter may: (a)recover from the owner: (i) ... the full
deposit, (iii) a civil penalty of $100, and (b) file an action in district court to
enforce compliance ... "
UCA § 57-17-5(2) allows for costs and attorney's fees to the prevailing party if the court
determines the owner acted in bad faith by withholding the security. Tenant sought the
return of the entire $2000 and attorney fees to force the return since Landlord sent the
November 17, 2015 notice so late, then kept the excess rents and failed to apply the same
to mitigate the expenses of re-taking and re-letting. Instead, Landlord kept all of Tenant's

v,
$2000 security as damages, but no damages were awarded to Landlord and his summary
judgment motion was denied. In equity this statutory provision should govern if the court
v;})

refuses to follow the contract and award fees for the default of Lessor.
Likewise, the unlawful detainer statute, in equity, should allow for attorney fees in
UCA §78B-6-811(3) to the "prevailing party". Although the statute was amended in 2017
to let either landlord or tenant obtain fees, such should be the equitable interpretation in
2016 as well, using the reciprocal theory so each party has an equal remedy under the law.
This action is still pending and the 2017 version should apply.
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Lastly, if Tenant is forced to pay Landlord's attorney fees for such a minor
infraction of the motion rules, then why should not Landlord pay Tenants attorney fees
under the bad faith statute in UCA §78B-5-825 or even Rule 56(h) since Landlord's claim
lacked merit and seemed to be asserted in bad faith to punish Tenant for subletting
without permission. Something is wrong when Tenant gets hammered for Landlord's
attorney fees on such a minor item and Landlord gets off scotch free for major violations
that were very distressing and damaging to Tenant. The Landlord's claim was without
merit, frivolous, and lacking in support of law from the beginning. The Appellate Court
needs to correct this injustice.
CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeals should uphold the grant of summary judgment to Tenant on
various grounds, including that Landlord elected his remedy under the contract and
cannot get excess rents, that the Tenant was never in unlawful detainer, and the common
law does not allow for lost profits to Landlords. The court should reverse the trial court
on the award of Landlord's attorney fees since Tenant's filings were not egregious,
caused no delay, were not in bad faith and harmless.
The Court of Appeals should find that Landlord was in default under the lease and
award Tenant all his attorney fees at trial and on appeal. Even if Landlord was found not
to be i~ default, the reciprocal statute should have applied to grant Tenant fees for
successfully defending against Landlord's para. 22. C. ( 1) action. In equity and justice,
Tenant was entitled to fees under the statutory provisions as well.
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LEASE AGREEMEm:'
THIS AGREEMENT, is ~aqe and entered int9 as of t h i s ~

day of

October, 2013 by and between Richard Gardiner, referred to herein as
"LESSOR," and Nels Andarson, referred to herein as "LESSEE.''

WITNESSETH;
:rn consideration of the mutual coven.ants, condi.tions ·and agz,eements
contained herein and the payment of rents herein s~ecified, LESSOR dQes
hereby lease to LESSEE and LESSEE d~es hereby lease f~om LESSOR the real
property and j.mprovem~ts hereafter ~dentified a5 th~ demised premises
pursuant to the following tel:lns and conditions:

1.

DEMISED PREMISES.
The

demised premise~

consis~

of

the

reai

property

anti

improvements, namely a warehouse, .situated thereon, located in th~ County
0-f Mill.ard, State of Utah, and described more specificaJ.ly as follows:

Beginning at a po.int 404.52· feet $cutp and 182 .. 01 feet troIIi th~
West quart~r corner of Section 6, Township 17 South, Range 6
West; Salt Lake .Base and Meridian, thence South 60 Degrees0914911 East 290.43 feet; thence Sputh 29 De,gx;ees 32'"West 324
feet; the~ce North 60 Degrees 09'49" West 24O.SJ feet; tbeD.Qe
North 21 Degrees 34' 01" west 64.12 feet to a point 50 feet
perpendicular co the East line of the Railroad right of way;

thence Nor'th 29 Deg.rees.32' East 284 feet paxalleJ.ing the East
line of the Railroad right of way to·the point of beginning~
Subject to· a Right o.f Way for a Col:lllty Road, and incidentai
purpos~s·as now exists.
2.

~.

. 0£6.

The te ~ t h i s lease agreement shall be a period of two (2)
years commencin{-o: N~vember l:, 2013, and extending to midnight on
October 31, 201jr!:"
'} .... \.\. f\ \
\ j _f.'•-tj" 0 ··. ~.
.r-~\'h .
~et i\'.&l\1 ~
]\ :°)ef" L "'i~\ w \\ '\ \'f....1.e1/'1.Q):, ~:L) ,:-u"'5 r1icv
fr\
~A

3.
-\~ ~-

~

RENT.
u.f\.t1

~ \ ·L \ 1 ·i •
l "'t ~e. "1&!' I( ~~l.....\'C
j

,<
J...:.

---iw

<(E'u,e◄ r, 1\AR,'\ ~ lW ;\\.ete~Hlf
~

t[J

~

l.

<S' In agdi tion to· any other payments or expenses requi.ced' of
l.ESSEE here~n, LESSEE shall pay to LESSOR, at 7616 Eartridge Berry Lane,
Clifton, VA 20124, or at su~h other place as L$SSOR may designate in
writ,ing, monthly rental payments in the amount of $1, 000 payable in
ad,;,ance on or before the fi£th day. of each. month. LESSEE shali also pay
LESSOR a security deposit of $2,000 upon the execution of this agreement.
4.

ASSIGNMEJNT·OR SUBLEASING.

LESSEE shall not a~sign, mortgage, or encumber this Lease, nor
sublet or permit the leased premises or any part thereof to be used by
-1-
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o~hers· for any purpose, without the ,Rrior :written co~.iSent of LE.SSOR l:>eing
first obtained in each instance; provided, howeverJ. thqt regardless oz
any such assignment or sublease, LESSEE shali remain primaril..y liable. for
the payment of the rent herein res~rv~d and fo~ the performance of all
the other terms of this lease.rec;ruired to be perfor\Tled by LESSEE.
5.

COMPLIANCE

WI'TE LAWS AND IN·SORANCE ..

The premises hereby-leased shall not be u~ed for any unlawful
purpose during the te:r.:m of the 1iease, and. LESSEE agrees to comply with
all fe!ieral, state, apunty and city ordinances, la.vs and ~egulations,
present or future, affecting the use of or the type of business to be
carried on in the demised premises. LESSEE shall no~ use the leased
p~emises in a manner which shall increase the rate of fire OF extended
coverage insurance in the h.uilding situate on ·the leased :eremises over
that in effect prior to this Lease.

6..

UTILITIES.
LESSEE

shall

furnish

and

timely pay

for

all

heat,

gas,

electr~city, power, water, hot water 1 lights, and all other utilities -0f
every type and nature whatsoeve.r us~d in or about said premises, and
~ha~l indellll).ify LESSOR agqinst any li.ability on such account.
7.

MAINTENANCE.

LESSEE shall maintain and repair the (ieinised p:i;-enu..ses at
LESSEE' s sole cost and expense, including, but not limited to·, electrical
fixtures, inte.rio.r painting and.. decorating, and glass replacement.
LESSEE shall be re~ponsilile for general clean-up when he 1eaves the

pxoperty. LESSEE further agrees that all damage o~ injury done to the
demised premises by LESSEE or by ahy person who may he in o± upon the
premises ~t LESSEE 1 s invitation er witli !.aESSEE's fermission ufter trre
~ffective date of this lease shall ba repaired by LESSEE at his sole: cost
and expense.
"8 •

·

LESSOR I s RIGHT OF EN'l'RY.

LESSOR or his agent (sJ

shall bave the right to enter the

d~mised p:cemi.ses at any reasonable time upon notice to LESSEE to examine

the same.and det~rmine the state of repair or alteration which shall or
may be necessary fo.r th~ safety o~ pre-servation of the demised prbperty.
If the denci.sed pr~i~es are damaged·by fire, wind, storm, or any o"th&r
casualty which. causes the clemised premises to be exposed to the eJ.ements,
or if any repairs a~e nee~ed o~ an emergency basi~ fGr the saf~ty er
preservation of the premises, and if LESSEE shall have not made repairs

thereto, then LESSOR.may enter upon the preniises to make such .emergency

repairs.

Such

action by ~SSOR shalJ.

not

excuse

LESSEE

fro':{U its

obligation to k~ep the demised p~emises in good repair.

In that event~
LESSEE. shall, upon demand -a f LES:SOR,. immediately reimhurse LESSOR for the
cost and expense of s~ch emergency repair, together with inter~st thereon
,..2-
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from the time of payment by LESSOR at the rate of ten pe.rcent {10%) per .

annum until paid.
9.

ALTERATIONS.

No al tei:ation, addition, .or· improv.ement to the d$ised prope~y
shall be made by LESSEE without the w.ri't:ten consent of LES.SOR which shall
non be 1.lllreasonably withheld by LESSOR.
Any arteration, -addition or

j.mp:izov~ent made by LESS~ after $U.Ch consent shall h.ave been gi-ven 7 ~nd
·any fixtures installed a:s part the.reef, shall, at LESSOR• s opti.Oil, become
the properly of LESSOR upon tbe termination of this Lease and be
·r3urre~dered l;Tith the premises; provi.ded., howeve~, that LESSOls shall ha:ve

the right to require LESSEE to remove such fixtures at LESSEE's east: upon
the termination of this Lease. Upon ~he removal of any such fixtures,

LESSEE shc'.ill be x;eqcrired to promptly repair cmy damage Qr injury done to
the premises by such removal and res tore the premises to as good
condition as the same were in. at the time LESSEE took oossession,
reas.onable wear cµid tear ex~pted. LESSEE shall indemnify LESSOR against
any mechanic'.s or materialma-n 's lien or other lien arising out of the
making of a.DY alteration, repair., addition, or improvement by LESSEE, and
shall hold LESSOR harmless Qf any suc;:h ~iens or claims, including

reasonable attorneys fees and costs that may be incw:red in removing any

such liens.

IiESSEE shall not -comrni t .aily waste or damage to the premises
hereby leased, nor permit any waste or damage to be ~one thereto.
11 •

PROTECTION OF PROPERTY.

LESSEE agrees to maintain the -demised property and improvementsin as good ·condition as they were at the time LESSEE took possession,
reasonable we~r and ~ear excepted. At the termination o~ the Lease in
any manner, LESSEE will surrender said :premise·s to LESSOR in the
condi:tion above described. Upon the termination of this teas,a,. LESSEE
may .1:embve any signs owned ~Y LESSEE from the 3iemised property, J?l'tomptly
repairing q.r1y damage or injury done to the premisea by such removal and
restoring said premises to the condition above described.

LESSEE shall maintain and pay for
coverage insurance upon the 4emised building
obligation to provide a..~y fire or ex~ended
persona1 property or c0ntents belo:p.ging to
pre.mises.

adequate fire and extended
and sha.11-ba:ve the duty and
coverage insurance for any
LE.SSEE within the demised

LESSOR shall pay all real estate taxes and real. pr-operty
-3-
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assessments levied against the demised property, with the exception of
any real estate taxes or personal property assessments on equipment,
machinery, or any other assets of any kind o~ nature placed.in or upon
the demised property by LESSEE.
.LESSEE shall pay all ofher taxes,
licenses, .and assessments of eve:ry kind, nature and description,
including all taxes and assessments on any equipment, machinery, or
assets of any kind or nature placed in or upon the demised premises by
LESSEE.
14 •

FIRE RISK,.

LESSEE shall not do anything in the demised premises or bring
or keep anything therein which shall, in any way, increase or tend to
increase the risk of fire or damage by explosion, or which will conflict
with regulations of the fire department or fire laws, or with any fire
insurance policy on the building or any part thereof, or with any rules
or ordinances established by the Health Department or with any. municipal,
·.state, county or federal laws, ordinances or regulations.
15.

ACCEPTANCE OF PREMISES.

LESSEE has examined the demised property and the bui1dings and

improvements situate thereon, and accepts the same in the condition and
state of repair they are now in. Neither LESSOR nor their agents have
mad~ any representation with respect to the demised premises except as
are expressly set forth herein. No rights, easements or licenses a.re
acquired by the LESSEE by i.~plication or otherwise, except as expressly
set forth in the provisions of this Lease Agreement.
16.

QUIET ENJOYMENT.

LESSOR covenants and warrants that, if LESSEE shall faithfully
and fully discharge the obligations herein set forth, ·LESSEE shall have
and enjoy. during the term of thi,s Lease, a quiet and undistur~ed
possession of the demised premises, together with all of its
appurtenances.
17.
(fj

NON-LIABILITY OF LESSOR FOR INJURY OR DAMAGE.

As a consideration for the making of this Le~se, LESSOR shall
not be liable for any injury or damage which may be sustained by the
person or property of LESSEE, or any othe:c persons or property, resulting
from the condition of said premises or any part thereof, or from the
streetr sidewalks, or subsurface,. or from any other source o:r cause
whatsoever.
Neither shall LESSOR be 1.iable for any defects in the
building, structures, or L.~provements on the demised premises, latent.or
otherwise.
18.

LESSEE INDEMNIFICATION.

LESSEE covenants and agrees not to do or suffer anything to be
-4-
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done by which persons or property in or about or adja~ent to the demised
premises may be i~ju:red, damaged,, or endang~r-ed. L~SSEE her~y agrees to
indemnify LESSOR against and to hold LESSOR harmless from any and all
claims or demands for loss ot or ·damage to property or for injury or
death tQ any person from any cause wh~tsoever while in, upon, o~ $out
the demi~ed premises during the term of. this lease o;r any e~tension
thereof. LESSEE shall, at LESSEE'S own expense, maintain any· workmari 1 s
compensation in~urance or a,ny other fo.r,m of in:;ra~~ce required by law
upon the employees or agents ·employed by LESSEE and LE$SOR shall have no
responsibility with xespect thereto-

19.

DESTRUCTION.

It is understood and agreed that, if the building upon the
demised premises shall be destroyed by fire, the elements, riots,
insurrections, explosions or any othar cause, ox be so damaged thereby
that it becomes untenan.table and cannot be rendared tenantab1e withi:n ten
(10) days from the date of such damage, this Leas~ ~ay be terminated by

either LESSOR or LESSEE; provided, however, that in t-he event the
building is so damaged, LESSEE shall not be ±equired to pay the rental
herein ~o-vided during the term the demised premises are whGlly mµit for
occupancy.. In the event that only a po·rtion of the demised premises be
damaged or beco~e nntenantable, then' the reritaJ. during the period that
·said premises remain partially untena;I;J,table shall. be r-educed. i:n the
proportion that the untenantable poition of said premises bear to the
total th~reof ..
20.

MU~OAL

RELEASE

OF. LIABILITY TO

THE

EXT.ENT

OF INStlRAN{!E

COVERAGE.

Neither LESSOR nor tESSEE shall be liable to the other £or any
business interruption or any loss or damage to property or injury to er
death ef persons qccurring on the demised property o.r the adj€1;ining

property, or in a.QY manner g.rowing out of or conn~c.ted. with LESSEE's use
and occupation of the demised premises1 or.the condition tbereofr or the
adjoining propert¥, whether or not ca.used by the negligence or other
.fault of LESSOR or LissEE or their respective ag~nts, emplQye~s.,.
subten~ts, licensees.s- or assignees. This reiease shall apply only to

the extent that su-eli business interruption loss 02: dama:ge to property, or
injury to or death of p~rsons is cove~ed by ins.ura+lce, rega~dless of
whether such insurance is payable t:o or protects LESSOR or LESSEE or

both. Nothing ifl this paragraph shaJ..l be construed to impo.se any ?ther
or greater liability upon either LESSOR o~ LESSEE than W<?uld !;lave existed
in t.J).e absence q,f the paragraph. This release shal1 be in· effec:t o~y so
long as the applicable insurance policies contain a clause to t~e effect
that this release shall not cµfect the right ot the insured to recover
under such policies.
22.

DEFAULT.
A.

Time and prompt pe:cformance of each and. every term,
-:5-
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covenant and condition of this Lease is material. and of the essence of
this Lease.
Every term, covenant and condition is a material term1
covenant and condition of this Lease.. Performance means compliance that
is full and to the letter of this Lease. Substantial compliance will not
be sufficient.
l?erfor:mance by LESSEE is a condition precedent to
performance by LESSOR.
B.
The following or any of them constit.q.te an event of
default of the terms of this Lease Agreement:
{i} Failure by LESSEE to pay when due any insta1lment of
rent or any other sum herein specified to· be paid by LESSEE if the

fail~re continues for ten days;
(2) Abandonment of the premises by LESSEE without cause
(for the purposes hereof, the failure to occupy and operate the premises
for ten consecutive days shall be conclusively deemed an abandonment of
the premises by LESSEE);
(3) Failure by LESSEE to perform any other provision of
this Lease required of LESSEE, if the failure to perform the same is not
cured within ten days after written notice has been given to LESSEE;

vi

{4} If LESSEE shall file or have filed against LESSEE in
any court pursuant to any statute, either in the United States or of any
other state,
a Petition in Bankruptcy or Insolvency, or for
reorganizations, or for appointir~nt of a receiver or trustee of all or a
substantial portion of the property owned by LESSEE, or if LESSEE makes
an assignment :for the benefit of creditors 1 or an execution or attachment
shall be issued against LESSEE on all or a substantial portion of
LESSEE' s property, whereby all o:c any portion of the premises covered by
this Lease or any improvements thereon shall be taken or occupied, or
attempted to be taken or occupied by someone other than LESSEE1 except as
may herein be otherwise expressly pennitted, and su~h adjudication,
appointment, assignment, petition, execution or attachment shall not be
set aside, vacated, discharged or bonded within ten· {10) days after the
termination, issuance, or filing of the same; and
(5) The taking by any person, except by LESSOR or its
agents or affiliates, of the leasehold created hereby or any part thereof
upon execution, or other process of law or equity other than by
assignment or sublease.
C.
Upon the occurrence -of any event of default, and the
failure, neglect or refusal of LESSEE to cure the same during any notice
period required for such default specified above, without further notice
to LESSEE, LESSOR shall be entitled to effectuate such rights and
remedies against LESSEE as are available to LESSOR under the terms of
this Lease Agreement and the laws of the State of Utah, including,
without limitation, the following remedies:

(1)

LESSOR shall have the immediate right, but not the
-6-
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obli~a:ion, to ternd:nate this Lease, and all rights of LESSEE hereunder
by giving LESSEE written notice 0£ LESSORfs election to te.rminate. No
act by LESSOR other than giving notice to LESSEE shall terminate this
lease • . In the event of such termi.nati·on, LESSEE agrees to surrender
possess7on of the premises immediately. Should LESSOR terminate this
Lease, it may recover from LESSEE all damages LESSOR may incur by reason
of LESSEE'S breach, including the·. cost of recovering the premises,
reasonable attorney's fees, and the worth at "the time of such termination
of the excess, if any, of the amount of rent and charges equivalent to
rent reserved in this lease for the remainder of the stated term over the
then reasonable rental value of the premises for tbe remainder of the
stated term, all of which amount shall be immediately due and paya:ble
from LESSEE to LESSOR.
(2) LESSOR shall also have the right, without process of
law, to enter the premises and remove all persons and property from the
premises without being deemed gu~lty of or liable in trespass. No· such
re-entry or taking possession of the premises by LESSOR shall be
construed as an election on its part to terminate this lease unless a
written notice of such intention is given by LESSOR to LESSEE. No such
action by LESSOR shall be considered or construed to be a forcible entry.
(3} LESSOR may, at any time, and· from time to time,
without terminating this Lease., enforce all of its rights and .remedies
under this Lease, or allowed by law or equity, inciuding the right to
recover all rent as it becomes due.
( 4)
In addition to the other rights of LESSOR herein
provided, LESSOR shall have the right, without terminating this Lease, at
its option, with or without process of law, to reenter and retake
possession of the premises, and all improvements thereon, and collect
rents from any SUBLESSEE and/ or sublet the whole or any part of the
premises for the account ox LESSEE, upon any terms or conditions
determined bv LESSOR. LESSEE shall be liable immediately to LESSOR for
all costs LESSOR incurs in relatting the premises, including without
limitation, brokers' commissions, expenses of remodeling the premises
required by the reletting, ·and 1ike co.s-r.s..
Re-letting can be for a
period shorter or longer than the remaining term of this lease. In the
event of such re-letting, LESSOR shall haver.he right to collect any rent
which may become payable under any sublease and apply the same first to
the payment of expenses incurred by. LESSOR in dispossessing LESSEEJ and
in re-letting the premises, andr thereafter, to the payment of the rent
herein required to be paid by LESSEE, iT• fulfil.l.ment of LESSEE I s
covenants hereunder; and LESSEE shall be liable to LESSOR for the rent
herein required to be paid, less any amounts actually received by Ll;:SSOR
from a sublease, and after paymen-c. of expenses incurred, applied on
account of the rent due hereunder. In the event of such election, LESSOR
shall not be deemed to have terminated this Lease by taking possession of
the premises unless notice of termination, in writing, has been given by
LESSOR to LESSEE.

' .
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D.

The

remedies

provided

in

this

Lease

Agreement are

cumulative and in addition to any remedies now or later allowed by law or

equity. The exercise of any remedy by LESSOR shall not be exclusive of
the right to effect any other remedy, allowed LESSOR under the te.rms of
this Agreement, or now or late.t: allowed by law or.equity.
E.
Any delay by LESSOR in enforcing the tenns of this
Agi:eement or any consideratj_cns or departures therefrom shall not operate
to waive or be deemed·to be a waiver of any right to require compliance
that is full and to the letter of tbis Agreement or to thereafter require
performance by LESSEE in strict accordance with the terms of this
Agreement.
~

F.
In the event t:bat any remed~• granted to LESSOR under the
terms of this Agreement is held void o.r unenforceable, LESSOR shall
nevertheless have all of the other remedies provided in this Agreement
that are not contrary to law.
23 •

ENFORCEMENT.

Should either party default in the performance of any covenants
or agreements contained herein, such defaulting party shall pay to the
other party all costs and expenses, including but not limited to, a
reasonable atto:r:ney• s fee, including such fees on appeal, which tbe
prevailing party may incur in enforcing tbis Agreement or in pursuing any
remedy allowed by law for breach hereof.

24.

vf

LESSOR 1 s RIGHT TO CORE LESSEE 1 S DEFAULTS.

If LESSEE shall default in the performance of any covenant or
condition in tnis Agreement req-~ired to be perfo:rmed by LESSEE, LESSOR
may, after ten days notice tc LESSEE, or without notice if in LESSOR 1 s
opinion an emergency exists, perfo.nn such covenant or condition for the
account and at the expense of LESSEE, in which event LESSEE shall
reimburse LESSOR for all sums paid to effect such cure, together with
interest from the date of the expenditure at the rate of ten percent
{10%) per annum and reasonable attornays fees.
All amounts owed by
LESSEE to LESSOR under this paragraph shall be additional rent.. In orde.r
to collect such additional rent ·LESSOR shall have all the remedies
available under this Agreement for a default in the payment of rent and
the provisions of this paragraph shall survive the termination of the
lease.
Nothing in this paragraph provided shall in any way require
LESSOR to perform or correct any such defaults on the part· of LESSEE.

25.

NOTICES.

Service of any notice permitted or required under the te.rms of
this Agreement shall b~ deemed complete upon the deposit of the same in
the United States ~.!ail, by Certified or Registered Mail, addressed to

LESSEE

at'l3~e- tv'!>, ?Toe. 1lD~ 1.9,,TA, u-r.1H1

Partridge Berry Lane,

,~,l-'f ; ora~~ddressed
to LESSOR at 7616
the case may be, or such

Clifton, VA 20124,

-8-
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other address as either shall hereafter in writing to the other
designate, or by causing said notice to be served personally upon LESSEE
or on LESSOR as the case may be. In the event LESSOR elects. to hire an
attorney to prepare any Notice of Default required by the terms of this
Agreement, LESSEE shall pay, in addition to any sums required to be paid
to cure said default, or in addition to any other performance required by
such party to cure such default, the costs of preparation of said default
notice, and said default shall not be cured unless and until said costs
are paid. The Notice of Default shall specify the amount of said costs.
26.

HOLDING. OVER.

If LESSEE remains in possession of the demised premises after
the expiration date of this lease or the termination of this lease for
any reason, with LESSOR's acquiescence and without any written agreement
between the parties, LESSEE shall be a LESSEE at will and except for the
term of such holdover, which shall he at LESSOR's will, the tenancy shall
be subject to all provisions of this Lease Agre,ement. LESSEE shall.be
responsible to LESSOR for ali damage which LESSOR shall suffer by reason
of LESSEE remaining in possession after the tennination of this agreement
and LESSEE hereby indemnifies LESSOR against all claims made by any
succeeding LESSEE against LESSOR resulting from delays by LESSOR in
delivering possession of the premises to such succeeding LESSEE. Nothing
in this paragraph shall be construed as a consent by LESSOR to the
possession of the premises by LESSEE after the termination of this Lease
Agreement for any reason.
27 •. KEYS AND LOCKS.

LESSEE shall not change locks or install other locks on doors
without the written consent of LESSOR who agrees not to withhold consent
unreasonabl~- If LESSEE does change locks or install new locks on·any
doors on the premises, LESSEE shall provide LESSOR with one key to each
such new lock. LESSEE, upon the termination of this Lease Agreement,
shall deliver to LESSOR all keys to 'any locks on the premises.

2a.

~-

LESSEE agrees not to pe:x:mit any lien for monies owing by ~E·s~E
to become a lien against tqe demised premises. In the event any l.ien is
created against the demised premises on the account of monies owing by
LESSEE, LESSEE shall cause the texmination of such lien within ten (10)

days following discovery of the same by LESSEE.

Should anr such lien be

filed and not released or discharged or· action not commenced to declare
the same invalid within ten (10) days a£ter discovery of the same by
LESSEE, LESSOR may at LESSOR'S option (but without any obligation 7o to
do) pay and discharge such lien •. LESSEE shall repay any sum so paid by
LESSOR and such amounts due to LESSOR shall be deemed ~dditional rent.
29.

LESSEE AS INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR.

-9-
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~

LESSEE' s use of the demised premises shall he as an independent

Lessee and nothing herein shall be deemed to create a partnership, joint
venture, employment, or master-sen~ant relationship between the parties.
30.

v;J

UTAH LAW GOVERNS.

This Lease Agreement shall be governed by, construed, and
enforced in accordance with the laws of the State 0£ Utah.
31.

MODIFICATION.

This Lease Agreement contains the entire agreement between the
parties, and may not be modified or changed orally, but only by ·an
agreement in writing a.~d signed by the party against whom enforcement of
any waiver, change, modification, or discharge is sought.
32.

BINDING ON SUCCESSORS.

It is further expressly agreed, that the provisions,
stipulations, terms, covenants.- conditions and undertakings in this lease
and any renewals thereof shall inure to the benefit of and bind the
heirs, executors, administrators and assigns or successors in interest of
both the LESSOR and LESSEE.

--,

L
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~

LEASE AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into, in duplica.tej effective M!!?I.,~, U>ls
by and between the following:

NELS ANDERSON, of 4370 West 2500 North, Delta. UT 84624. rcf'eued to
in this Lease Agreement as "Landlord;', :and

LIQUA-DRY INC., a Utah cotpora.tion, of3000 North 7500 W~ Delta, UT
84624, ~eferrcd to in this Lease Agreement as "Tenant.11
Landlotd and Tenant are refcncd to herein jointly as the "Parties" or my be refen-cd to
singularly as a Party.
RECITALS

A. Landlord controls real property (the "Landj located· in Millard County, Utah,
sometimes referred to as the old Northrop-King property located at approximately 800 Nonh
100 W esr., Delta, UT 84624 and more particularly described as:
Beginning a.ta point 404.52 feet South and 182.01 feet East from the West quarter
comer of Section 6, Township 17 South, Range 6 West, SLB&M; thence South
60°09'49 11 E-ast 290.43 feet; thence South 29°32r West 324 feet; thence North
60°09'49" West 240.53 feet; thence North 21 °34'01" \Vest 64.12 feet to a. point
50 feet perpendicular to the ~ t line of the railroad right-of-way; thence North
29 °32' East284 feet paralleling the cast line of the railroad right-of-way the point
of beginning.
SUBJECT TO a right-of-way for a county road and incidental pucposes as now
e.xists.

B. The Land has a large metal building on the property suitable for the use of Tenant

;.;,

C. Landlord desires to reserve one office inside the building for Landloxd>s purposes.
Tenant is familiar with the office being reserved and is willing to allow Landlord to use that
office.

D. Tenant desires to lease the Land with the build~g from L2ndlord. The Land and
building (less the office reserved for Landlord's.use) shall be referred to herein as the nt.cascd
Premises.,,
~

NO\V t THEREFORE~ for the mutual considcradon expressed herein, the Parries
covenant and agree as follows:
1. Adoption of Recitals. The Parties :adopt the above: Recitals as part of this agreement.
150402.84.4\buildingl=sc agrumciu:t
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2. Lea.se of Premises. Landlord hereby leases the Leased Premises to Ten:antand Tenant
hereby leases the Leased Premises from Landlord on the: tcnns and conditions set out in this

Lease Agreement
3. Term of Lease. The teun of the lease herdn granted to Tenant shall be for the period
beginning April 1, 2015 -and continuing through September 30, 2015.·

3.1. This lease may be modified by the Pa~es only.by a written agtecment executed
strictly in the manner provided in this agreement.
3.2. This lease may be sooner terminated under the provisions set oo.t in this lease.
4. Extension of the Tenn or Lease. Tenant m.ay make two (2) one~month extensions to
the term of the lC11Sc by giving Landlord notice one (1) month in advance of such extension that

Tenant is extending the lease. The first extension would extend the lease term to October 31,
2015. The second extension would extend the lease tcnn to November 30, 2015. Tenant may
extend this lease only if it is in full complian.:e with all terms. covenants. and obliga.tions of
Tenant under the terms of this Lease Agreement -a.t the time of extension of the term of the lease.
5. Rene for Leased Premises. Rent in the amount of F!VE THOUSAND DOLLARS

(.SSt000.00) shall be paid on or before the first day of each month by Tenant for the use of the
Leased Premises. Rent is due and payable each month during the term of the lease ,vhether or
not the building is occupied by the Tenant
6.. Electric Power. Tenant shall pay all electric power bills on the Leased Premises on or
before the due date of such bill. Landlord will provide the electric bill to Tenant within five (5)
days of the da}' L~ndlord 1:cceivcs such bill. Tenant will pay the electric bill dirccdy to Rocky
Mountain Power or its successor.

7. Trash. Tenant shall promptly remove its trash and refuse fro~ the Le2scd Premises.
8. Restroom. Landlord will be responsible for all normal maintenance to the restroom
facilities and for maintaining the water supply to the restroom.
9. Tcn2ntinsu.rancc. Tenant bears all rjsk of loss for its property on the Leased Premises.
Tenant shall obtain renter's insurance or other insurance to protect Tcna.nt against such risk of
loss. Landlord has no insurance for losses related to Tenant and assumes no risk of loss for
Tenant's propeny.
10. Exclusion of Warranty of Fitness or Habitability. Landlord a11d Tenant specifically
acknowledge tha.tTcnant is dosely familiar \vith the condition of the Leased Premises and the
suitability of the Leased Premises for use by Tenant in ·it business operations. Tenant
acknowledges thatirhas had opportunity to determine the suitability of the: Leased Premises for
this intended use. LANDLORD BXPRESSLY EXCLUDES ANY WARR.ANTYTHATTHE
150402.84.-4\bisilding l=scagm::mcnu
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(ii)

On the l,~
day of itAt'/
1 2015 p'ersonally appeated befotc me NELS
ANDpRSON , as a signer of the foregoing Lease Agreement;, who duly acknowledged to me .that
he executed the same.

STATE OF UTAH

)

: ss.
COUNTY OF MlLLAJtD )
I ~"I'-<

;. 1'

On the w- day of J\f\ft\4
2015. personally appeuca before me BLEND
LEBARON, who1 being py me duly swotn., did say that hc 1 the said Elend Lebaron., is the
C.CO
·
of Liqna-D%J Inc,, and that the foregoing Lease Ag-reement was signed in
behalf of said cotporation by autherity of its Board ofDirectors and the said El end Lebaton duly
ackno,vledged to me. that said co~ora.tlon executed the_ same.

Notary PubllG
BRIAN C FLORANG
Commission# 675457
t.ir~~Mardl 10,2~8
State cfUlah

vi)

1S0402.!4.4\bui!dinglcasc 11gcccmcntl
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@.

Gmail· - Re: New email address

Page 1 of 1

Richard Gardiner <regardiner73@gmail.com>

Re: New email address
1 message

-·· ·-·- .............. ·-------- - ·--···-·----··
Nels Anderson <nels.anderson1234@gmail.com>

.......... --- ---···· _,..._ .... ,.". ····--..--····----

----

.

-

Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 11 :43 AM

To: Richard Gardiner <regardiner73@gmall.com>

l will get you some thanks!

On Oct 27, 2014 9:41 AM, "Richard Gardiner' <regard1ner7S@gmail.com> wrote:
· Can you send me pictures of the door?

Thanks.
Richard
. On Monday, October 27, 2014, Nels Anderson <neJs.anderson1234@gmail.com> wrote:

Hello Richard
Hopefully this E-man finds you and yours well and enjoying life and what's left of this fall season
Just by way of Information. the north west Door on the shed has collapsed 1t was In bad shape from
the beginning and has now finally given up. the ghost . I will be replacing the door with a new one and
using what salvageable parts remain to replace and rebuild the remarning two overhead doors.
Additionally one of my nelghbors has suffered a fire at his facility ~nd 1 am going to be al1oWing him to
use some of the· space in our warehouse to house his supplies until he has time to get his
: facilify rebuilt 1 some time in tt,e spring . This wllt work out fine for me s1n·ce he plans on being out of
the shed before I need to use all of the space to store the Onion crop that I am going to be raising this
coming season • I will also be working this winter on installing an Onion sorting line that will allow me
to package those onions into packages for consumer use .

I just wanted to let you know of my 1ntentions and use of the building in order to maintain transparency
and keep you apprised of the situation so that there would be no surprise's
Thanks Nels
On Fri1 Aug 22, 2014 at 4:21 PM, Richard Gardiner <regardiner73@gmall.com> wrote:
l have changed my email address to: regardiner73@gmailcom
Richard Gardiner

~

https://mail.googie.c:om/maiI/u/O/?ui=2&ik.=e708fe9d4c&view=pt&search=inbox&th=ll'lf.-ROOO{)(\f27n.014
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Todd Anderson (#12432)
Anderson Law Center, P. C.
PO Box 183
259N.Hwy6
Delta, UT 84624
Telephone: 435-864-4357
Facsimile: 435-216-3106
todd@deltaattomey.com

Attorney for the Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF l\JIILLARD
Fourth District Court, 765 South Hi hwa 99, Fillmore UT 84631

RICHARD E. GARDINER,

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR PREJUDGMENT
WRIT OF ATTACHMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No.: 160700010

NELS ANDERSON,
~

Defendant.

Judge: Jennifer Brown

STATE OF VIRGINIA

)

COUNTYOFFAIRFAX

)

Plaintiff, Richard E. Gardiner, being first duly sworn and under oath, states as follows:
1) I am the plaintiff in this matter and. make this affidavit based upon my own personal

knowledge, experience, and belief.
2) I am seekip.g to attach three real properties of Defendant located in Millard County,
which are identified in the Millard County land records as .parcels D02632, D031609b

1, andD03161.

3) Upon information and belief, all three properties are agricultural land and are titled to
Page 1 of6
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Nels Curtis Anderson (Defendant) and Mary B. Anderson, 21880 West Old Hwy 37,
Malad, ID 83252.
4) The tax assessed values of the properties are:
a. D02632 (60 acres) ($12,500);
b. D03160-1 (40 acres) ($8,000); and

c. D03161 (40 acres) ($8,000).
5) Upon information and belief, while currently assessed and taxes due have not been

paid for the properties, the properties have not been tak;en for a tax, assessment or
fine.
6) Upon information and belief, the properties have ~ot been seized under a writ against

the property of Plaintiff nor are they exempt from seizure.
7) The only persons known to Plaintiff to claim an interest in the properties are Nels
Curtis Anderson (Defendant) and Mary B. Anderson, 21880 West Old Hwy 37,
Malad, ID 83252.
8) Upon information and belief, ~he properties are not earnings and not exempt from
execution.
9) The writ of attachment is not sought to hinder, delay or defraud a creditor of
Defendant.
10) There is a substantial likelihood that Plaintiff will prevail on the merits of the
underlying claim for the following reasons.
11) The claim is for breach of lease of a warehouse because, during the tenn of the lease,
contrary to the express terms of the lease (that Defendant not "sublet ... the leased
premises ... , without the prior writte~ consent of LESSOR being first obtained in
Page 2 of6
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each instance"), Defendant sublet the leased premises, without the prior written
consent of Plaintiff, from December, 2013 through September, 2015. Plaintiff
attached to his Complaint documents from the subtenant, including copies of rent
checks, evidencing that the premises were sublet. For each of the months Defendant
sublet the premises, the rent Defendant received from the subtenant exceeded the rent

paid to Plaintiff by a total amount of $53,100.
12) Utah Code § 78B-6-802 provides that "sublet[ting] the leased premises contrary to
the covenants of the lease" is an "unlawful detainer."
13) Utah Code§ 78B-6-811(2) provides that ''the jury or the court, if the proceeding is
tried without a jury or upon the defendant's default, shall also assess the damages

resulting to the plaintiff from any of the following: ... (b) ... unlawful detainer .... "
~

14) Plaintiff's damages are the amount that the rent Defendant received from the
subtenant exceeded the rent paid to Plaintiff, i.e., $53,100.
15) Utah Code§ 78B-6-811(3) provides that, for an "unlawful detainer," the 'judgment
shall be entered against the ·defendant for the rent, for three times the amount of the
damages assessed under Subsections (2)(a) through (2)(e), and for reasonable
attorney fees.''
16) Three times the amount of the damages assessed under Subsection (2)(b) is $159,300.
17) Based on the documents from the subtenant, and in light of Utah Code § 78B-6-802,

Utah Code§ 78B-6-811(2), and Utah Code§ 78B-6-811(3), Defendant has no viable

defense to the claim. Plaintiff thus has a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the
merits of the underlying claim.
18) Defendant has left the state with intent to defraud Plaintiff, a creditor, based on the
Page3 of6
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following.
19) In the lease, Defendant agreed that "(s]ervice of any notice permitted or required
under the terms of this Agreement shall be deemed complete upon the deposit of the
same in the United States Mail, by Certified or Registered Mail, addressed to
[Defendant] at4370 West 2500 North, Delta, UT 84624."
20) By certified mail of September 3, 2015, Plaintiff gave Defendant notice of
Defendant's default, i.e., subletting the premises without Plaintiff's written consent,
and gave Defendant ten days to cure the default by paying Plaintiff the monies
Defendant received from the subtenant
21) In response to Plaintiff's letter, which Defendant did not pick up from the post office
after several delivery attempts, Defendant sent an email to Plaintiff on September 8,
2015, informing Plaintiff that Defendant was notified that the letter was "at the post
office," but that Defendant did not "retrieve it" .and asking what the letter concerned.
Plaintiff emailed a copy of the letter to Defendant a few minutes later. Defendant did
not respond. The certified letter was returned to Plaintiff by the Postal Service with a
yellow sticker stating: "no mail receptacle, unable to forward".
22) By certified mail of September 14, 2015, Plaintiff notified Defendant that Defendant
had not cured the default (by paying Plaintiff the monies Defendant received from the
subtenant). Plaintiff also notified Defendant that Plaintiff was exercising his right to
terminate the Lease, notified Defendant that the Lease was terminated, and notified
Defendant that he must "surrender possession of the premises immediately."
Defendant did not pick up the letter from the post office after several delivery
attempts. Plaintiff had. a copy of the letter served on Defendant by the Sheriff of

Page4 of6
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Millard County on September 28, 2015. Although Defendant vacated the premises,
the letter was returned to Plaintiff by the Postal Service with a yellow sticker stating:
"unclaimed, unabl~ to forward". Defendant did not communicate with Plaintiff in
response to the letter.

23) By certified mail of November 17, 2015, Plaintiff notified Defendant of the amounts
that would be deducted from Defendant's $2,000 security deposit ($1,563.89).
Plaintiff also demanded that Defendant pay Plaintiff $51,300 for the rent Defendant
received from the subtenant over and above the rent Defendant paid to Plaintiff. The
total demanded from Defendant was $50,863.89. The letter was returned to Plaintiff
by the Postal Service with a yellow sticker stating: "no mail receptacle, unable to

forward". Defendant did not respond to the letter.
24) On November 18, 2015, Plaintiff received an email from Guild Mortgage Company
asking Plaintiff to confirm that Plaintiff was no longer doing business ·with Defendant
because Defendant was applying for a home mortgage refinance. Plaintiff promptly
infonned Defendant, by email, of the email from Guild Mortgage Company and
Defendant requested that Plaintiff respond to Guild Mortgage Company. Plaintiff
responded to Guild Mortgage Company as requested by Defendant. Defendant did
not communicate with Plaintiff after Plaintiff responded to Guild Mortgage
Company.
25) Upon information and belief, although Defendant resided in Delta, Utah during the
term of the lease~ according to the land records of Millard County, Defendant did not
own a residence in Millard County. Thus, the home mortgage refinance sought by
Defendant does not appear to be for a residence in Utah.

f
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l

26) According to the land records of Oneida County, Idaho, Defendant owns a residence
in Malad, Idaho, on which the taxes were paid in December, 2015. Plaintiff located

this property after an extensive internet search of Defendantt s name and
communication with Oneida County, Idaho tax authorities.

27) By leaving Utah and moving to Idaho, apparently some time after November 18,
2015, without informing Plaintiff of anew address when Defendant knew that he
~

owed monies to Plaintiff for breach of a lease, Defendant has attempted to prevent
Plaintiff from recovering the monies Defendant owes Plaintiff, thereby intending to
defraud Plaintiff.
28) Payment of the claim has not been secured by a lien upon property in the State of
Utah.

DECLARATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 78B-5-705
I, Richard E. Gardiner, declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing is
true and accurate to the best of my understanding and recollection, and certify the information
given to be true.

Richard E. Gardiner
Plaintiff
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Todd F. Anderson (#12432)
Anderson Law Center, P.C.
PO Box 183
259 North Hwy 6
Delta, UT 84624

Telephone: 435-864-4357
Facsimile: 435-216-3106
todd@deltaa~omey.com
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MILLARD

RICHARD E. GARDINER

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff
vs.

)·
)
)
)

NELS ANDERSON
Defendant

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMI\1ARY .ITJDG~
Civil No.: 160700010
Judge Jennifer I?rown

)

STATE OF VIRGJNlA

COUNTY OF FAIRFAX
Plaintiff, Richard E. Gardiner, being :first duly sworn and under oath, states as follows:
1) I am the plaintiff in this matter and make this affidavit based uponfacts ofwhich!havepersonal
knowledge and about which I am competent to testify.
2) The rent for the warehouse was graduated because property belonging to a previous tenant

(William York) had been· 1eft at the warehouse and Defendant had to deal with York concerning the
removal of the property and Defendant agreed to dispose of the property that York did not remove. In fact,
Defendant wrote on the Lease: "A13 per email with Richard 600 first month 700 per month thereafter until
the York issue is settled then $1000 thereafter''. Plaintiff did not graduate the rent because Defendant fixed
-1-
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or repaired the warehouse, as those were his duties under the lease. See 1 7 ("LES SEE shall maintain-and
repair the demised premises at LESSEE's sole cost and expense ....").
3) Defendant- did not inform Plaintiff that Defendant made all repairs to, and cleaned up, the
warehouse, did not inform Plaintiff that the warehouse was marketable or how it was used by Liqui-Dry,
Inc., did not inform Plaintiff that the warehouse was not harmed, and did not inform Plaintiffwhether the
utilities had been pai~ nor did Defendant provide Plaintiff any documentation of such matters. On the
~

contrary, after Defendant moved out of the warehouse, Plaintiff had to replace the toilet ($158.99) and to
repair three (3) electrical fixtures ($1,405 estimated). Plaintiffdeducted from Defendant's security deposit.
4) Defendant did not timely pay the rent every month, which was "payable in advance on or before

the fifth day of each month." Lease 1 3.
5) As.of the time of filing this action, Plaintiff had no lrnowledge of whether Liqua-Dry, Inc. had
~

a fire at its facility and needed to rent space while the fire damages were being cleaned up and the facility
remodeled.
6) Other than the response shown on Defendant,s Exhibit 1, i.e., responding to Defendant's

information concerning the north west door ("Can you send me pictures of the door?"), Plaintiff did not
respond to Defendant's email of October 27, 2014 and did not, at any time, consent in writing (or orally
or in any other manner) to Defendant's subletting of the warehouse to Liqtii-Dry, Inc. Thus, Plaintiff doe~
not have a second email stating that "it was fine with landlord if [Defendant] sublet to the person who had
the fire ...."

7) In an email dated June 2, 2015 (attached), Defendant informed Plaintiff: ''I am using the entire
shed at this time ....)'
8) Plaintiff was not made aware that Defendant was subletting the warehouse to Liqui-Dry, Inc.
until in or about late July, 2015 when Plaintiff was so informed by his attorney, Todd Anderson (who was
-2-

Addendum 029
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

then representing Plaintiff in a case against the previous tenant of the warehouse for unpaid rent). Plaintiff
then communicated directly with Liqui-Dry, Inc. and, to confirm that Liqui-Dry, Inc. was, and had been,
subletting the warehouse, Plaintiff requested a copy of Defendant's lease with Liqui-Dry, Inc. and copies
of rent payments by Liqui-Dry, Inc. to Defendant. After receiving a copy of the lease and copies of rent
payments in August, 2015, Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant on September 3, 2015 by certified mail of
his default and gave him ten days to cure the default.
9) Prior to being employed to represent Plaintiff in the case at bar, Todd Anderson was employed

~

by Plaintiff to represent Plaintiff in a case against the previous tenant of the warehouse for unpaid rent.
Todd Anderson was only employed as Plaintiff's agent in Utah with regard to the warehouse for very
limited purposes. With respect to Defendant, Todd Anderson's only authority was to meet with.Defendant
in October, 2013 to show him the warehouse and then to transfer the keys to the warehouse to Defendant

and, in April, 2014, to communicate with Defendant by email regarding the removal of the previous
~

tenant's personal property. All other discussions between Plaintiff and Defendant concerning the
warehouse were conducted directly between Plaintiff and Defendant.
10) On September 1, 2015, Defendant paid the rent

of $1,000 for the month of September, 2015.

In September, 2015, Liqui-Dry, Inc. entered into a lease with Plaintiff and paid Plaintiff$2,200 for the rent

for October, 2015 and provided a security deposit of$4,400; no other payments were received from LiquiDry, Inc. in October, 2015.
11) On September 8, 2015, Defendant sent Plaintiff an email stating:~'[ just got a call from my
wife, I am out of town, she said that there was a registered letter at the post office from you." In response,

Plaintiff stated: "Attached is the letter I sent to you by certified mail." Copy attached.
12) Plaintiff has no lmowledge of the reason~ Defendant elected to surrender possession and does
not have knowledge of the date Defendant moved out.
-3-
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13) Plaintiff has no knowledge of whether Defendant received his letter ofNovember 17, 2015 or,

if Defendant did not receive it, the reason he did not receive it.
14) Paragraph 7 of the Lease provides in part:
LESSEE shall maintain and repair the demised premises at LESSEE's sole cost and
expense, including, but not limited to, electrical fixtures, interior painting and decorating,
and glass replacement
Three (3) electrical :fixtu:res needed to be repaired, at an estimated cost of $1,405 (see first three

items on attached estimate) and the toilet had to be replaced at a cost of $158.89, for a total of $1,563.89.
The balance of the $2,000 security deposit ($43 6.11) was applied to the monies owed Plaintiff resulting
from subletting the premises in violation of the Lease, i.e., the difference between Defendant's rent and

what Defendant received from Liqua-Dry Inc. 1:
11/13

$1,650

12/13

$1,650

1/14
2/14
3/14
4/14
5/14
6/14
7/14

$1,550
$1,550

8/14

9/14
10/14
11/14
12/14

1/15
2/15
3/15
4/15
5/15
6/15

$1,550

$1,550
$1,450
$1,250
$1,250
$1,250
$1,250
$1,250

$2,000
$2,000
$2,000
$2,000
$2,000
$4,000

$4,000
$4,000

For purposes of this affidavit, Plaintiff accepts Defendant's statement in ,r 8 of the Verified
Memorandum of the amounts ofrentDefendantreceived from Liqui-Dry, Inc.
1
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7/15
8/15
9/15

$4,000
$4,000
$4,000
$51,200

15) Plaintiff has no knowledge of whether Defendant vacated and surrendered the premises before
'\

September 13, 2015.
16) On November 18, 2015, Plaintiff received an email_from Guild Mortgage Company asking

Plaintiff to confirm that Plaintiff was no longer doing business with Defendant because Defendant was
applying for a home mortgage refinance. Plaintiff promptly informed Defendant, by email, of the email

from Guild Mortgage Company and Defendant requested that Plaintiff respond to Guild Mortgage
Company. After several emails between Plaintiff and Defendant (see copy of attached emails), Plaintiff
responded to Guild Mortgage Company as requested by Defendant. Defendant did not communicate with

Plaintiff after Plaintiff responded to Guild Mortgage Company.
17) Plaintiff would have agreed to the sublease if Defendant had paid Plaintiff the difference

between Defendant> s rent and what Defendant received from Liqua-Dry Inc. Plaintiff thus suffered a loss
of the difference between Defendant's rent and what Defendant received from Liqua-Dry Inc.

DECLARATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 78B-5-705
I, Richard E. Gardiner, declare under criminal penalty ofthe State of Utah that the foregoing is 1rue
and accurate to the best ofmy understanding and recollection, and certify the information given to be true.

Dated this}

~-1ay of June, 2016.

llLJ>. lL
Richard E. Gardiner
Plaintiff
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~

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be served on all other e-filers in this case, and as identified
below, a true and exact copy of the following described document, via the Court's electronic
filing process. Any pa1-ty not currently subscribed as an e-filer has been served by ·regular
U.S. Mail on Friday, June 24, 2016.
DOCUMENT SERVED:

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF,S
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

PERSONS SERVED: via electronic filing
Marlin J. Grant
Attorney for Defendant
~

PERSONS SERVED: via regular mail
PERSONS SERVED: via email

Isl Todd F. Anderson
(;j

Todd F. Anderson

(jj)
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Gmail - Re: Nels Anderson

Page 1 of 3

Richard Gardiner <regardiner73@gmail.com>
·...

Re: Nels Anderson
1 message
Nels Anderson <nels.anderson1234@gmail.com>
To: Richard Gardiner <regardiner73@gmail.com>

Thu, Nov 19, 2015 at 8:45 PM

I will have it to you by Tuesday the 2nd of December
I am not trying to be difficult or hard to deal with. I am trying to solve this problem of getting some
acknowledgement from you that you are no longer renting your shed to me. Please I reach out to you a
man and ask for your help with this it will only take all of 5 minutes please and thank you Nels
11

On Nov 19, 2015 6:41 PM, Richard Gardiner''<
When exactly will you get me the email?

> wrote:

On Thursday, November 19, 2015, Nels Anderson<

> wrote:

First of all I am not at home nor will I be I am in Colorado until Sunday. Please take a moment and
draft a small letter indicating I am no longer renting your shed! Please help me in this Nels
On Nov 19, 2015 6:04 PM, "Richard Gardiner" <regardiner73@gmail.com> wrote:
'Mly can't you activate your email with arc tonight?

On Thursday, November 19, 2015, Nels Anderson <nels.anderson1234@gmail.com> wrote:
I really do not not off the top of my head, in order for me to access it I have to activate my email

with ate. And then review them I will get the letter to you as soon as I can. Can I pay you for your
time to draft this small letter for me. I will as I stated get the email to you but it won't be until the
first of Dec. Please help me out with this Nels
On Nov 19, 2015 5:42 PM, "Richard Gardiner" <regardiner73@gmail.com> wrote:
What is date of the other one? Bear in mind that you qid not sign the lease until late October,
2013.
On Thursday, November 19, 2015, Nels Anderson <nels.anderson1234@gmail.com> wrote:
There is another one, this is not the one I am referring to. t simply don't have time to scan
through all of them at this moment to get them to you. But J will. Would you please take a
moment and get a quick letter for me . I need to finalize this please please help me -on this.

Ne~

.

On Nov 19, 2015 5:15 PM, "Richard Gardiner" <regardiner73@gmail.com> wrote:
Not yet I am waiting for you to confirm that this was the email to which you referred, or for
you to send me a copy of the email if this is not it.
On Thursday, November 19, 2015, Nels Anderson <nels.anderson1234@gmail.com>
wrote:
Have you been able to address the guild mortgage letter?
On Nov 19, 2015 4:51 PM, "Richard Gardiner" <regardiner73@gmail.com> wrote:

Is the attached the emails to which you refer?

https://maiLgoog1e.com/rnaiVu/0/?ui=2&ik=e708fe9d4c&view=pt&search=inbox&th=15 ... AWnb~~~
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Gmail - Re: Nels Anderson

On Thu, Nov 19, 2015 at 10: 11 AM, Nels Anderson <nels. anderson 1234@gmail.com>

wrote:

lj

Richard, I will gladly do that, it was done in approximately Aug of 2013 it was done
on my heritagevalley@atcnet.net email accoun~ I will get it to you, however I am in
the middle of processing and organizing the pre thanksgiving delivery of turkey. We
are needing to close on this property on Monday . I won't be able to get you a copy
of this until the end of next week due to my schedule of events for the next 10/days.
I would greatly appreciate your cooperation in thi~ matter. I have never tried to be
contentious or decietful in any way . I will get you this information as soon as l can
after Thanksgiving. Would you please be so kind as to answer their request today!
Thanks again Nels
11

~

On Nov 19, 2015 8:00 AM, Richard Gardiner" <regardiner73@gmail.com> wrote:
Before I answer her, I would appreciate your providing me a copy (or
at least the date) of the email in which you "told (me] that [you were]
renting a portion of the shed to a company that had suffered a fire and
they were in need of temporary space" and my "email indicated in

writing that I was fine in doing so. 11
On Thu, Nov 19, 2015 at 9:28 AM, Nels Anderson
<nels.anderson1234@gmail.com> wrote:
~

I would appreciate it if you would respond to their request Thanks Nels
On Nov 19, 2015 7:26 AM, "Richard Gardiner" <regardiner73@gmail.com>

wrote:

·

That is correct.
On Thu, Nov 19, 2015 at B:20 AM, Nels Anderson
<nels.anderson 1234@gmail.com> wrote:
Hello and good morning Mr Gardiner, what were her questions exactly? I
believe that she asked if our relationship with the shed in Delta was still
ongoing and if I would continue to receive income from that project, is that
correct? Please advise thanks Nels

On Nov 19, 2015 5:13 AM, "Richard Gardiner" <regardiner73@gmail.com>
wrote:
Mr. Anderson-

~

I spoke with this lady yesterday. She informed me that you
were applying for a home mortgage refinance. Is this
legitimate? Do you want me to reply?
Richard Gardiner
- - - - Forwarded message - - From: Alexis Fisher <alexisf@guildmortgage.net>
Date: Wed, Nov 18, 2015 at 4:26 PM
Subject Nels Anderson
To: regardiner73@gmail.com

Mr. Gardiner,
~
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Gmail - Re: Nels Anderson

Page 3 of 3

Thank you for calling me back and speaking with me regarding the lease
contract that you were previously involved in with Mr. Nels Anderson. If I
could get something in writing from you stating that you are no longer
doing business with Mr. Anderson and went that business relationship
ended it would be very appreciated.

Thank you for your time,

Guild Mortgage Company
1047 S 100 W Ste 100
Logan; UT 84321

Company NMLS # 3274
Equal Housing Lender

rm
This transmission is confidential and may be privileged or proprietary. If you are
not the intended recipient, you are not authorized to use the information in this
transmission in any way. Please inform the sender immediately if you have
received this transmission in error and permanently delete and destroy the
original and any copies of the information.
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Gmail - Re: Hello Richard

Richard Gardiner <regardlner73@gmail.com>

Re: Hello Richard
1 message
Richard Gardiner <regardiner73@gmail.com>
To: Nels Anderson <nels.anderson1234@gmail.com>

Wed, Sep 9, 2016 at6:26 PM

I am not concerned about a shouting match; since I communicated to you in writing, I would
like to have your response in writing.
> wrote:

On Wed, Sep 9, 2015 at 6:22 PM, Nels Anderson <
It isn•t going to become a shouting match I am not that type of person!

On Sep 9, 2015 4:21 PM, 11 Richard Gardiner"<

> wrote:

I would prefer if you would communicate by email.
On Wed, Sep 9, 2015 at 6:11 PM, Nels Anderson<

> wrote:

I would like to visit with you on the phone. thanks Nels
On Sep 8, 2015 2:37 PM, 11 Richard Gardiner''<
Attached is the letter I sent to you by certified mail.

> wrote:

On Tue, Sep 8, 2015 at4:16 PM, Nels Anderson<

> wrote:

I just-got a call from my wife, I am out of town, she said that there was a registered letter at the
post office from you. I may not be back in town in time to retrieve it. I was wondering what was

up thanks Nels

vj
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Gmail- Re: Rent Transfer to your Wells Account

Page 1 of 1

Richard Gardiner <re_gardiner73@gmail.com>

Re: Rent TraQsfer to your Wells Account
1 message

Nels Anderson <nels.anderson1234@gmail.com>
To: Richard Gardiner <regardiner73@gmail.com>

Tue, Jun 2, 2015 at 9:09 AM

Yes Richard I am using the entire shed at this time. and quite frankly wish that it were larger. Thanks again
until next month Nels,
On Jun 2, 2015 4:57 AM, "Richard Gardiner" <regardiner73@gmail.com> wrote:
Thank you; I got the payment yesterday,

Thank you also for the improvements. Are you using the whole warehouse now?
Richard

On Mon, Jun 1, 2015 at 10:29 PM, Nels Anderson <nels.anderson1234@gmail.com> wrote:
Hello Richard! Today was the first and I made the rent deposit to your wells Fargo account just
wanted to let you know. I made the deposit around 2 my time. It was instantaneous. I also wanted you
to be aware that I in addition to replacing one door with a new one and repairing the other garage
doors have now fixed the restrooms and installed new bathroom fixtures toilets sinks and a new hot
water h.eater. Just wanted you to know what I have done. Thanks Nels
On May 1, 2015 6:23 PM, "Richard Gardiner" <regardiner73@gmail.com> wrote:
Thank you. I got It.
On Fri, May 1, 2015 at 4:59 PM, Nels Anderson <nels.anderson1234@gmail.com> wrote:
Hello Richard
Just a note about 4 hours ago I transferred to your Well Fargo Account the rent for the month of
May
Thanks Nels

hrtps://mail.google.com/maiVu/0/?ui=2&ik=e708fe9d4c&view=pt&search=inbox&th=l4db7(ddfn"tJ~~J?
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KW Electric Inc.

Estimate

375 N. 490 E.
Delta, Ut 84624

Name I Address

Date

Estimate#

9/10/2015

194dt

Ship To

Liquid Dry

Description

hang 3 fixtures that have been removed rebuild them with new
ballast and lamps
Repair existing hanging fixtures on west side
Repair existing hanging fixtures on east side
ballast and lamp kits
install covers in electrical room
bid is for lower lights high area not included

Qty

P.O.No.

Project

Cost

Total

3

135.00

405.00

4
4

125.00
125.00

500.00
500.00

11
l

148.32
75.00
0.00

1,631.52
75.00
0.00

Subtotal

·Sales Tax (6.0%)

Total

$3,111.52

$0.00
$3,111.52

Phone#

435-592-3375
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Todd F. Anderson (#12432)
Anderson Law Center, P.C.
PO Box 183
259 North Hwy 6
Delta, UT 84624
Telephone: 435-864-4357
Facsimile: 435-216-3106
todd@deltaattomey.com

Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MILLARD
Fourth District Court, 765 South Highway 99, Fillmore, UT 84631

RICHARD E. GARDINER

)
)

Plaintiff

)
)
)
)

vs.

NELS ANDERSON

)

)

Defendant

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPO.&:l:.QF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Case No.: 160700010
Judge Jennifer Brown

)

STATE OF VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF FAIRFAX
Plaintiff, Richard E. Gardiner, being first duly sworn and under oath, states as follows:
1) I am the plaintiff in this matter and make this affidavit based upon facts of which I have

personal knowledge and about which I am competent to testify.

,r

2) 4 of the Lease provided that Tenant could not '~sublet ... the leased premises ... , without
the prior written consent of LESSOR being first obtained in each instance ...."
3) Plaintiff did not, at any time, consent in writing (or orally or in any other manner) to
Defendant's subletting of the warehouse to Liqui-Dry, Inc.
4) Plaintiff would have agreed to the sublease if Defendant had paid Plaintiff the difference

-1-
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between Defendant's rent and what Defendant received from Liqua-Dry Inc. Plaintiff thus suffered a
loss of the difference between Defendanfs rent and what Defendant received from Liqua-Dry Inc.
5) The losses to Plaintiff from Defendant's violation of the Lease are the difference between
0$

Defendant's rent and what Defendant received from Liqua-Dry Inc. 1:
11/13

$1,650

12/13

$1,650

1/14

$1,550

2/14
3/14

$1,550

4/14
5/14

6/14
7/14
8/14
9/14
10/14
11/14
12/14
1/15

2/15
3/15
4/15

5/15
6/15
7/15
8/15

9/15

$1,550
$1,550
$1,450
$1,250
$1,250
$1,250
$1,250
$1,250
$2,000
$2,000
$2,000
$2,000
$2,000
$4,000
$4.,000
$4,000
$4,000
$4,000
$4,000
$51,200

6) Plaintiff was not made aware that Defendant was subletting the warehouse to Liqui-Dry, Inc.
until in or about late July, 2015.

7) 122(B)(3) of the Lease provides:
(3)

Failure by LESSEE to p_erform any other provision of this Lease required of

LESSEE, if the failure to perform the same is not cured within ten days after written

1

For purposes of this affidavit, Plaintiff accepts Defendant's statement in ,i 8 of Defendant's Verffied

Memorandum Of Points And Authorities (filed June l, 2016) of the amounts of rent Defendant received from
Liqui-Dry, Inc.
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notice has been given to LESSEE .... (emphasis added).

8) Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant on September 3, 2015 by certified mail (copy attached)
which gave Defendant written notice of his default and gave him ten days to cure the default by paying
Plaintiff the monies Defendant received from Liqui-Dry, Inc. and by removing the property of Liqui-

Dry, Inc. from the premises. Pursuant to

,r 25

of the Lease, Plaintiff sent the letter to Defendant at

4370 West 2500 North, Delta, UT 84624.
9) On September 8, 2015 Defendant sent Plaintiff an email stating: "I just got a call from my
1

wife, I am out of town, she said that there was a registered letter at the post office from you.'' In
response, Plaintiff stated: "Attached is the letter I sent to you by certified mail." Copy attached.
10) By certified mail of September 14, 2015, ~laintiffnotified Defendant that he had not cured
the default and notified Defendant that Plaintiff was exercising his right, pursuant to ,i 22(C)(l) of the
Lease, to terminate the Lease and notified Defendant that the Lease was terminated, and notified
Defendant, pursuant to ,i 22(C)( I) of the Lease, that he must "surrender possession of the premises

·,

·

~

immediately." Pursuant to if 25 of the Lease, Plaintiff sent the letter to Defendant at 4370 West 2500
North, Delta, UT 84624. 2
I I) Defendant did not cure the breach by paying to Plaintiff the difference between
Defendant's rent and what Defendant received from Liqua-Dry, Inc.

12) Defendant vacated and surrendered the premises by the end of September, 2015.
13) To date, Defendant has not paid to Plaintiff the difference between Defendant's rent and
what Defendant received from Liqua-Dry, Inc.

2

Although Plaintiff was required by the Lease only to give Defendant notice at the address in the Lease,
Plaintiff also had a copy of the September 14, 2015, letter served on Defendant by the Sheriff ofMillard·County
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~

DECLARATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 78B-5-705
I, Richard E. Gardiner, declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing is
true and accurate to the best of my understanding and recollection, and certify the information given to
be true.

Dated this

·r // :J,,µ--

_/z. day of July, 2016.

t....L~.£

t'/}j

t-

Richard E. Gardiner
Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be served on all other e-filers in this case, and as identified
below, a true and exact copy of the following described document, via the Court's electronic filing
process. Any party not currently subscribed as an e-filer has been served by regular U.S. Mail on
Wednesday, July 06, 2016.

DOCUMENT SERVED:

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

~

PERSONS SERVED: via electronic filing

Marlin J. Grant
Attorney for Defendant
PERSONS SERVED: via regular mail
PERSONS SERVED: via email
/s/ Todd F. Anderson
Todd F. Anderson

on September 28, 2015.
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RICHARD E. GARDINER
7616 Partridge Berry Lane·

Clifton, VA 20124
September 3, 2015

Nels Anderson
4370 West 2500 North
Delta, UT 84624
Re: Lease

Dear Mr .. Anderson:
I am m:iting to notify you, pursuant to ! .22 CB) (3) of the Lease we entered
into on or about Octobe.r 30, 2013, 1 that you are in default because you

~[f]ailted] • • • to perform. I
0

4

of the Lease, in that you usublet • • • the

leased premises • • . , without the prior written consent of LESSOR being first
obtained in each instance • • . . ,r In particnl.ar, you entered into a l.ease with

LIQUA-DRY INC. on or about May 6, 2015 without obtaining my prior written
consent. It is my understanding that you received six (6) pa,Yments in the
amount of $5,000 each.
Pursuant to I 22 (B) (3} of the Lease, you have "ten days after w.ritten
notice has been given" to you to cure the default. The ten days begins on the
date this letter is post-maxked. 2 To cure the default, you must pay me the
monies you received from LIQUA-DR.Y INC., i.e., the sum of $30,000, and you must
remove the property of LIQUA-DRY INC. from the premises. If I have not received
the sum of $30,0;00, and the property of LIQOA-DRY INC. has not b_een removed from
the premises, wi.thin ten days of the date this l.etter is post-max:ked, the
default will not be cured and I will exercise my right, pursuant to i 22(C) Cl)
of the Lease, to tei::m.inate the Lease.
If you have not paid me the sum of $30,000, and the property 0£ LIOUA-DRY
INC. has not been. removed from the premises, within ten days of the date th.is
letter is post-marked, please considez this letter my notice to te:cminate the
Lease.

~hus, if you have not paid me the sum of $30,000, and the property of

LIQUA-DRY INC. has not been removed from the prentj.ses, wi.thin ten days of the
date this letter is post-marked, you must, pm:suant to i 22 (C} (1) of the Lease,

"surrender possession of the premises immediately.»
Sincerely yours,

Richard E. Gardinez:
1

~~he foll.owing or any of them constitute an event of defau1t of the teDDS of

this Lease Agreement: • • • (3) Failure by LESSEE to perform any other provision of
this Lease required. o.f LESSEE, if the failure to per£orm the same is not cured within
ten days after »ri.tten notice has been given to LES.SEE • • • • "

·

2.
"Service of any ootice permi.tted or requi.red under the tex:ms of this
Agreement shal1 be deemed compl.ete upon the deposit of the same in eb.e United States
Mail, b,:y Certified or Registered Mail . . . . "

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(j)

RICHARD E. GARDINER

7616 Partridge Berry Lane
Clifton, VA 20124
September 14, 2015

Nels .Anderson
4370 West 2500 North
Delta, UT 84624

Re: Lease Te.Illlination
Dea.r Mr- Anderson:
I am. writing to notify you, pursuant to f 22 (B) (3) of the Lease we
entered into on or about Ocrtober 30, 2013, 1 that you·are in default because
you ~{f]ail[edJ • • • to perfo.:i::m" ! 4 of the Lease, in that you ~sub1et ••

• the leased premises • • • , without the prior written consent of LESSOR
being first obtained in each instance • • • • H In particular, you entered
into a lease with LIQOA-DRY INC. on. or about May 6, 2015 without obtaining my
prior written consent.
It is my understanding that you received six {6)
payments in the amount of $5,000 each.
Pursuant to !' 22{:B} (3} of the Lease, you had ''ten days after wxitten
notice has been given" to YoU to cure the default. I gave you such notice by
certified mail dated and postmarked September 3, 2015. The ten days began on
the date the letter was post-marked. 2
You infor.ined me in an email on

September 8, 2015 that you were notified that the letter was -at the post
office.,,., but that you did not "'retrieve it." I responded to ·you that same day
by email with a copy of the letter.
Because you did not cure tbe default by Septembei: 13,, 2015, I hereby
exercise my right., pursuant to (J[ 22{C) (1) of the Lease, to tei:minate the Lease
and hereby notify you that the Lease is tex:minated. Pursuant to 131 22(C} {l)
of the Lease, you must ~surrender possession of the premises im:mediateiy. 0

sincerely yours,,

;-, 4
L_

11'

~

Richard E. Gardiner

1 "'?he fo1lowing or any of them constitute an event 0£ · defa'UJ.t of the tel3DS of
thi.s Lease Agreement: _ • • (3) E'ail.u:re by LESSEE to perfont any other provision of
this Lease required ot' LESSEE, if the failure to perform the same is not cured within

ten days a£ter written notice has been given to LESSEE • • • -"
2

"Service of any notice permitted or :required under the terms of this

Agreement shall be deemed complete upon the depos:L.t 0£ the .same· in the 'United States
Mai1, by Certified. or Registered Mai.l • • • • 11
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RICHARD E. GARDINER
7616 Partridge Berry Lane
Clifton, VA 20124
November 17, 2015
Nels Anderson

4370 West 2500 North
'Delta, UT 84624

Dear Mr. Anderson:
When we signed the Lease, you paid me a security deposit of $2,000. I am
writing to inform you that the'security deposit will be deducted from what you
owe me for violating the Lease.
Paragraph 7 of the Lease provides in part: "LESSEE shall maintain and
repair the demised premises at LES.SEE' s sole cost and expense, including, but
not limited to, electrical fixtures, interior painting and decorating, and glass
replacement."
I had to have three (3) electrical fixtures repaired, at an
estimated cost of $1,405 (see first three items on attached estimate). I also
had to have the toilet replaced at a cost of $158.89, for a total of $1,563.89.
Paragraph 4 of the Lease provides in part that you could not ~sublet . •
. the leased premises . . . , without the prior written consent of LESSOR being
first obtained in each instance • • . . . " In particular, you sublet the leased
premises to LIQUA-DRY INC. beginning in December, 2013 without obtaining my
prior written consent. The copies of the checks/bank statements that LIQUA-DRY
INC. has provided me show that you received the following payments:

~

~

12/2/13

$4,500

1/3/14
2/3/14
3/5/14
4/2/14
5/1/14
6/2/14
7/2/14

$2,250
$2,250

8/1114
9/1/14

$2,250
$2,250
$2,250
$4,300

10/1/14
11/3/14
12/2/14

$2,250

$2,250
$2,250
$2,250

$2,250

$3,000

1/1/15
2/2/15

$3,000
$3,000

3/2/15
4/1/15
5/1/15

$3,000

6/1/15

$5,000

7/1/15
8/1/15
9/1/15

$5,000

$5,000

$5,000
$5,000
$5,000

-1-
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Because I would have agreed to the sublease if you had paid me the
difference between your rent ($1,000/month} and what you received from LIQUA-DRY
INC., my damages resulting from your breach of the Lease are as follows:

12/2/13

$3,500

1/3/14
2/3/14
3/5/14

$1,250
$1,250

4/2/14
5/1/14

$1,250

6/2/14
7/2/14
8/1/14
9/1/14
10/1/14

11/3/14
12/2/14

$1,250
$1,250
$1,250
$1,250
$1,250
$1,250
$1,250
$3,300
$2,000

1/1/15

$2,000

2/2/15

$2,000
$2,000
$4,000

3/2/15
4/1/15
5/1/15

$4,000

6/1/15
7/1/15
8/1/15
9/1/15

$4,000
$4,000
$4,000
$41:000
$51,300

The total you owe me is thus $52,863.89. After deducting the $2,000 you
paid me as a security deposit, you owe me $50,863.8.9.
If I have not received payment within 15 days of the date of this letter,
I will be compelled to initiate litigation against you to recover the
$50,863-89, plus all costs and expenses and a reasonable attorney's fee, as
provided for by Paragraph 23 of the Lease.
I · will also be seeking treble
damages of $153,900 pursuant to Utah Code§ 78B-6-811(3) because "sublet[ting]
the leased premises contrary to the covenants of the lease" is an "unlawful
detainer'' pursuant to Utah Code § 78B-6-802.
;

.. Final:1:Y~ .. ·if. you hav_~· nq·t removed you~ pe:::~o~al ·p~operty f:t:om the premises
within 15 days of the date o'f this letter;- I.. will ·deem that property to be
abandoned and will dispose o·f it as I see fit.

Sincerely yours,

Richard E. Gardiner

~
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FjLE
DEC 2 7 2016
HH 01Sl"RIC7

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUR11~=6g~~~
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD E GARDINER,

RULING AND ORDER RE: Dispositive
Motions

Plaintiff,

v.

NELS ANDERSON,
Defendant.·

Case No. 160700010
Judge Jennifer A. Brown

The matters before the Court are Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for
Summary Judgment filed June 1, 2016, and Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment filed July
6, 2016. Plaintiff filed his Memorandum in Opposition on Jmie 24, 2016 and Defendant's
Memorandum in Opposition was stricken by this Court. Defendant filed a Reply Memorandum
in Support ofhis motion on July 7, 2016. Oral arguments y,ere heard.on October 24, 2016, at
which time the Court took the matter under advisement. Having reviewed the pleadings
submitted by the parties and hearing the arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in ~e
premises, the Court now enters the following Ruling:

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a Lease, on or about October 30, 2013, for the lease
ofa warehouse located in the County of Millard, State of Utah. The term of the Lease was a
period off:Wo (2) years commencing on November I, 2013, and extending to midnight on
•J

October 31, 2015. For the months ofNovember and December, 2013, the agreed rent was $600
per month. For the months of January through April 2014, the agreed rent was $700 per month.
For May 2014, the agreed rent was $800 per month. For the months of June 2014 through
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October 2015, the agreed rent was $1,000 per month.
Defendant contends he moved out before the 10 day Notice to Quit required it (thus,
defendant was not in unlawful detainer); Defendant had paid all rents due; and left the premises
better than when Defendant first rented it.
Paragraph 4 of the Lease provided that Tenant could not "sublet ... the leased premises .
. . , without the prior written consent of LESSOR being first obtained in each instance ...."
Defendant sublet part of the premises to Liqua-Dry, Inc. orally, month to month from November
1, 2013 for $2,250, then for $3,000 a month on November 1, 2014 to March 31 2015, then signed
a 6 month written lease from April 1, 2015 to September 30, 2015 for $5,000 a month.
Defendant sublet the leased premises to Liqui-Dry, Inc. without the prior written consent of
Plaintiff. Plaintiff claims he would have agreed to the sublease if Defendant had paid Plaintiff the
difference between Defendant's rent and what Defendant received from Liqua-Dry Inc. Plaintiff

argues he suffered a loss of the difference between Defendant's rent and what Defendant
received from Liqua-Dry Inc.
Plaintiff claims his losses from Defendant's violation of the Lease are the difference
between Defendant's rent and what Defendant received from Liqua-Dry Inc totaling $51,200.
Plaintiff claims he was not made aware that Defendant was subletting the warehouse to LiquiDry, Inc. until in or about late July, 2015. Paragraph 22(B)(3) of the Lease provides:
(3) Failure by LESSEE to perform any other provision of this Lease required of
LESSEE, if the failure to perfonn the same is not cured within ten days after
written notice has been given to LESSEE .... (emphasis added).
Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant on September 3, 2015 (by certified mail) giving Defendant

written notice of his default and giving him ten days to cure the default by paying Plaintiff the
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monies Defendant received from Liqui-Dry, Inc. and by removing the property ofLiqui-Dry,
Inc. from the premises. Pursuant to ~ 25 of the Lease, Plaintiff sent the letter to Defendant at
4370 West 2500 North, Delta, UT 84624. By certified mail of September 14, 2015, Plaintiff
notified Defendant that he had not cured ~e default and notified Defendant that Plaintiff was

exercising his right, pursuant to ~ 22(C)(l) of the Lease, to terminate the Lease and notified
Defendant that the Lease was terminated, and notified Defendant, pursuant to 1 22(C)(l) of the
Lease, that he must "surrender possession of the premises immediately." Pursuant to ,r 25 of the
Lease, Plaintiff sent the letter to Defendant at 4370 West 2500 North, Delta, UT 84624.
Defendant did not pay Plaintiff the difference between Defimdant' s rent and what
Defendant received from Liqua-Dry Inc. Defendant vacated and surrendered the premises by the
end of September, 2015. Plaintiff argues that to date, Defendant has not paid to Plaintiff the
difference between Defendant's rent and what Defendant received from Liqua-Dry, Inc.
DISCUSSION

Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions for summary judgment
· and states that the court shall grant summary judgment if the moving party shows "that there is
no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In addition, "[t]he party moving for summary judgment has the
burden of presenting evidence that no genuine issue of material fact exists.'' Uintah Basin Med
Ctr. v. Hardy, 2008 UT 15, ,r 16, 179 P.3d 786 (citing Rule 56(e)). The Utah appellate courts
have made clear that "the nonmoving party is entitled to all inferences arising from the facts of
record." Id at 118 (citing Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, ,I 10, 48 P.3d 235).
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Pursuant to this standard, the Court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact
precluding the court from granting summary judgment in this case. It is undisputed that
Defendant sublet the premises to Liqui-Dry without prior written authorization as required by the
lease agreement. It is also undisputed that Plaintiff served Defendant with a I 0-day notice to
quit or cure required by 122(B)(3) of the Lease and Defendant vacated the premises promptly

thereafter.
Unlawful Detainer

Utah Code Ann. §78B-6-801 (9) defines ''unlawful detainer" to "mean□ unlawfully

li

remaining in possession of property after receiving a notice to quit, served as required by this

chapter, and failing to comply with that notice." According to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-802(1 )(d), a tenant is guilty of an unlawful detainer if the tenant "assigns or sublets the leased
premises contrary to the covenants of the lease, or commits or pennits waste on the premises
after service of a three calendar days' notice to quit" 1
1

~

Plaintiff argues that in Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-6-802(1)(d), the comma separating the phrase "assigns pr sublets the
leased premises contrary to the covenants of the lease,, from the following phrase indicates that the phrase "after
service of a three calendar days' notice to quit', modifies only the phrase "commits or pennits .waste on the
premises." Accordingly, Plaintiff contends that no notice is required by the unlawful detainer statute for an action
for subletting the leased premises contrary to the covenants of the lease.
The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiffs argument Courts are "to interpret the provisions of a statute in hannony
with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters." State v. J.MS. 2011 UT 75,122,280 P.3d 410
(mtemal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, courts should seek to avoid interpretations ''which render some
part ofa provision nonsensical or absurd.,, O'Dea v. Olea, 2009 UT 46, ,I 32,217 P.3d 704 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Here, aside from a comma, the Court does not find anything within the unlawful detainer statute
which would indicate that unauthorized subletting somehow supersedes the notice provisions contained therein or
that the legislature intended for a party to be in unlawful detainer (and subject to the punitive nature of treble
damages such as those requested by Plaintiff in this matter) without notice. Such an interpretation would render the
notice requirements for all other unlawful detainer actions nonsensical or absurd. Accordingly. the Court declines to
find Defendant in unlawful detainer prior to notice having been given by Plaintiff.
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Paragraph 4 of the Lease provided that Tenant could not "sublet ... the leased
premises ... , without the ·prior written consent of LESSOR being first obtained in each

instance ...." Defendant does not dispute that he sublet the premises to Liqui--Dry, Inc. and that
he charged Liqui..Dry, Inc. greater rent than he was paying Plaintiff. Further, Defendant did not
obtain Plaintiff's prior written consent to sublet the warehouse. Accordingly, Defendant breached
the lease. However, Defendant complied with the 10--day notice to quit and did not "unlawfully
remain in possession of the property." UCA §78B--6-801(9).

Plaintiff argues that under Code§ 78B-6-81 l(l)(b), the court may enter "an order for the
restitution of the premises," and, under Code§ 78B--6-811(2)(b), the court ''shall also assess the

damages resulting to the plaintiff from" an "unlawful detainer." Thus, it is apparent that the Utah
State Legislature contemplated that damages would be recoverable for "sublet[ting] the leased

premises contrary to the covenants of the lease ...." Plaintiff argues its losses are "directly
traceable" to Defendant's breach of the lease and Plaintiff may recover those losses as damages.

However, Utah Code Ann § 78B-6-811 (2) does not specifically provide for damages for·
subletting contrary to the lease agreement. It provides:

(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried without a jury or upon the defendant's
default, shall also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff from any of the following:

~

(a) forcible entry;
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer;

(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's tenancy, if waste is alleged in the
complaint and proved at trial;
(d) the amounts due under the contract, if the alleged unlawful detainer is after
default in the payment of amounts due under the contract; and
(e) the abatement of the nuisance by eviction as provided in Sections 78B--6-l l 07 through 78B-6-11 l 4.
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Additionally, the lease agreement does not specifically provide for damages. It only
states _that "regardless of any such assignment or sublease, LESSEE shall remain primarily liable

for the payment of th~ rent herein reserved and for the perforniance of all the other terms of this
lease required to be performed by LESSEE."
It is undisputed that Defendant was current on rent and was only evicted for defaulting
under the lease agreement by subletting without prior written consent. Also, there is some
evidence that Defendant notified Plaintiff's agent of the subletting via email almost a year prior
ltD

to Plaintiff enforcing that provision of the lease. Accordingly, the Court finds the requested
$51,200 in damages to be excessive. There is nothing in the statute or the lease agreement to
support such damages. Furthermore, according to the definition of unlawful detainer found in
UCA §78B-6-801(9), Defendant was not in unlawful detainer. Therefore, the only remedy
Plaintiff appears to be entitled to is a declaration under UCA §78B-6-811 (c) that the lease
agreement is forfeited due to Defendant's failure to perform a condition or convent therein.

Breach of Contract

In the Second Claim for Relief, Plaintiff seeks damages for breach of the Lease, in
particular for breach of paragraph 4 of the Lease, which provides that Defendant could not
"sublet ... the leased premises ... , without the prior written consent of LESSOR being first
obtained in each instance ...." Defendant does not dispute that he sublet the premises to Liqui..
Dry, Inc. and that he charged Liqui-Dry, Inc. greater rent th~ he was paying Plaintiff. Further,

Defendant did not obtain Plaintiff's prior written consent to sublet the warehouse. Accordingly,
Defendant breached the lease. Finally, Plaintiff gave Defendant the notice to cure required by 1
22(B)(3) of the Lease.
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Plaintiff argues that Defendant did not cure the breach by paying to Plaintiff the
difference between Defendant's rent and what Defendant received from Liqua-Dry Inc. and has
not done so to date. Defendant contends that he vacated possession and turned it over to Plaintiff
landlord immediately upon notice. As a result, Defendant cannot, as a matter of law, be in
unlawful detainer. Moreover, the fact he may have defaulted the lease by subletting without
written pennission only creates a default, but that default never ripened to unlawful detainer
because tenant returned possession to Landlord. The parties dispute whether Utah Code Ann.
§78B-6-802(d) requires the continued subletting "after service of a 3 day calendar notice to

quit" Plaintiff contends the 3 day notice is only required for the provision "or commits or
permits waste on the premises." Plaintiff argues to interpret it otherwise would nullify the entire
provision. However, the definition of unlawful detainer found in UCA §78B-6-801(9) seems to
support Defendant's interpretation of the statute that the unauthorized subletting must continue
after service of the notice to quit.
~

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $51,200, representing the difference between
what Defendant paid in rent to Plaintiff and what Defendant collected from Liqua-Dry for the
W1authorized subletting. The Court does not find support for these damages in the unlawful
detainer statute or the lease agreement. Utah Code §78B-6-801(9) defines ''unlawful detainer" as
"unlawfully remaining in possession of property after receiving a notice to quit... and failing to
comply with that notice." The Court finds that Defendant complied with Plaintiff's 10 day
notice and did not remain in unlawful possession of the property. Furthermore, even if

Defendant were in unlawful detainer pursuant to 78B-6-802(1 )(d) for the unauthorized subletting
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of the property, Section 78B-6-811(2) does not specifically provide for damages for
unauthorized subletting. Furthermore, the lease agreement does not provide for damages as
requested by Plaintiff. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby
DENIED and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
This ruling constitutes the final order of the Court on this issue. No further order is
necessary to effectuate the Court's decision.
DATED this ;;2.7

_µ
day of December, 2016.

~
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following
people for case 160700010 by the method and on the date specified.
MANUAL EMAIL:
MANUAL EMAIL:

TODD F ANDERSON todd@deltaattorney.com
MARLIN J GRANT grant@loganattorney.com

Date:
Deputy Court Clerk

Printed: 12/27/16 17:17:00
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Todd Anderson (#12432)
Anderson Law Center, P.C.
PO Box 183
259N. Hwy 6

Delta, UT 84624
Telephone: 435-864-4357
Facsimile: 435-216-3106

todd@deltaattomey.com
Attorney for the Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE·COUNTY OF MILLARD
Fourth District Court, 765 South Highway 99, Fillmore, UT 84631

RICHARD E. GARDINER,
Plaintiff,

~

ORDER ON MOTIONS TO STRIKE

vs.
Civil No.: 160700010

NELS ANDERSON,
Judge: Anthony Howell
Defendant.

Before the Court is Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Defendant's Reply and Plaintiff's Motion to
Strike: Defendant's Reply and Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. At a hearing
he]d on October 24, 2016, Plaintiff was represented by Todd F. Anderson and Defendant was
represented by Marlin J Grant. At that hearing the Court ruled on these two motions from the bench.
Regarding those Motions,

THE COURT FINDS:
1. In regards to Defendant's Reply Supporting Motion for Summary Judgment filed on July 7,
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2016 (the "Reply"), the Court finds that the time prescribed by Utah R. Civ. P. 7(e)(l) had
lapsed prior to the Reply being filed, no motion to extend the allotted response time had been
made or granted by the Court.
2. In regards to Defendant's Reply and Objection to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
lj

filed on July 26, 2016 (the "Objection"), the Objection fails to comply with the requirements
of Rule 7 in the following regards:
1. To the extent that the filing was a memorandum opposing Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment, the Court finds that the time prescribed by Utah R. Civ. P. 7(d)
(1) had lapsed for the Defendant to file memorandum opposing Plaintiff's Motion for

Summary Judgment, and no motion to extend the prescribed time had been made or
granted by the Court.
2. The Objection failed to comply with the technical requirements of Utah R. Civ. P.
7(d)(l), which provides that "[t]he nonmoving party must title the memorandum

substantially as: 'Memorandum opposing motion [short phrase describing the relief
requested].' The memorandum must include under appropriate heading and in the
following order ... :" .(Emphasis added).
3. Moreover, the Objection failed to conform with the requirements of Utah R. 56(a)(2)
in that it failed to include "verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts
that is disputed with an explanation of the grounds for the dispute supported by citing
to materials in the record under paragraph (c)( 1) o~ this rule."
3. However, in that there are cross motions for summary judgment, the Court does find that
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is opposed by Defendant and will consider the

vR
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arguments and material from Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for
Summary Judgment filed on June 1, 2016.
IT IS ORDERED:
I. Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Defendant's Reply and Piaintiffs Motion to Strike:

Defendant's Reply and Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment
(collectively the "Motions") are both GRANTED.
2. The foliowing filings are stricken and shall not be considered be the Court.
1. Defendant's Reply Supporting Motion for Summary Judgment filed on July 7, 2016

2. Defendant's Reply and Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment filed
on July 26, 2016.

3. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgmen~ is opposed because there are cross motions for
summary judgment and the Court will consider arguments and material from Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment filed on June 1, 2016 in
determining the cross motions for summary judgment in this case.
4. Plaintiff is awarded his reasonably incurred attorney fees and costs associated with the
Motions.

*****END OF ORDER*****

Approved as to Fonn:

Isl Todd F. Anderson
Todd Anderson, attorney for Plaintiff
Isl Marlin J. Grant, by TF A per instruction email on 12/29/2016

Marlin J. Grant, attorney for Defendant
~

January 04, 2017 10:18 AM
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I caused to be served on all other e-filers in this case, and as identified below, a true and exact copy
of the following described document, via the Court's electronic filing process. Any party not currently subscnl>ed as an
e-filer has been served by regular U.S. Mail on Wednesday, January 04, 2017.
DOCUMENT SERVED: (proposed) ORDER

ON MOTIONS TO STRIKE

PERSONS SERVED: via electronic filing
Marlin J. Grant
Attorney for Defendant
PERSONS SERVED: via regular mail
PERSONS SERVED: via email

Isl Todd F Anderson
Todd F. Anderson

4j
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Todd Anderson (#12432)
Anderson Law Center, P .C.
PO Box 183
259 N. Hwy 6
Delta, UT 84624
Telephone: 435-864-4357
Facsimile: 435-216-3 l 06
todd@deltaattomey.com

Attorney for the Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF lVIILLARD
Fourth District Court, 765 South Highway 99, Fill1:11ore, UT 84631

RICHARD E. GARDINER,
4j

ORDER OF HEARING HELD JUNE 9,

Plaintiff,

2017
vs.
NELS ANDERSON,
Defendant.

Civil No.: 160700010
Judge: Jennifer A. Brown

Before the Court are the following Motions and Filings:
• Defendant's Motion and Memorandum of Costs and Fees;
• Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Defendant's Reply in Support of Attorney Fees and Costs;
• Plaintiff's Amended Affidavit of Attorney Fees and Costs (filed pursuant to the Court's Order
on Motion to Strike entered on January 4, 2017); and
• Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Defendant's Response Supporting the Supplemental Authority.
At a hearing held on June 9, 2017, Plaintiff was represented by Todd F. Anderson and Defendant

v,

July 07, 2017 05:01 PM
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was represented by Marlin J Grant. At that hearing, the Court found and ruled as follows:

I. Regarding Defendant's Motion and Memorandum of Costs and Fees: The Court took this
Motion under advisement and has entered a separate ruling on this Motion.

IL Regarding Plaintifrs Motion to Strike Defendant's Reply in Support of Attorney Fees and
Costs:
a. THE COURT FINDS: That the basis of Plaintiffs motion is that the Defendant's reply
was not limited to "rebuttal of new matters raised in the memorandum opposing the
motion" as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 7(e)(l). Specifically, that while the Defendant's
motion only cited to paragraph 23 of the Lease Contract as its basis for an award under
Utah R. Civ. P. 73(b)(l), the Defendant's Reply included references to additional
paragraphs of the Lease Contract, and thus, Plaintiff argued that Defendant's Reply
exceeded the scope allowed under Utah R. Civ. P. 7(e)(l). The Court Finds that Utah R.
Civ. P. 73(b)(l) only requires that a motion filed under that rule specify the "contract"
that entitles movant to an award and does not require that'the movant direct the Court to
a specific provision of a particular contract being relied upon as the basis. Accordingly,
· the reference and inclusions of paragraphs other than 23 did not violate Utah Rule 7(e)
(I) as the Defendant had referenced the Lease Contract in the Motion.
b. Accordingly, THE COURT ORDERS: Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendant's Reply in
Support of Attorney Fees and Costs is DENIED.
Ill. Regarding Plaintiffs Amended Affidavit of Attorney Fees and Cost (filed pursuant to the
Court's Order on Motion to Strike entered on January 4, 2017):
a. THE COURT FINDS: The Defendant's liability for attorney fees and costs claimed in the

July 071 2017 05:01 PM
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Amended Affidavit are pursuant to the Court's Order on Motions to Strike entered on
January 4, 2017. Accordingly, it is not necessary for Plaintiffs Amended Affidavit to
assert a basis for the award under Utah R. Civ. P. 73(b). However, upon review of the
Amended Affidavit, the Court finds that some attorney fee entries contained in the
Amended Affidavit are unreasonable under Rule 73. Specifically, the July 11, 2016,
entry should be reduced from $227.50 to $113.75; and, the January 11, 2017, entry
should be reduced to $262.50. The remainder of the fees and costs claimed in the
Amended Affidavit are reasonable.
b. Accordingly, THE COURT ORDERS:
i. Plaintiff, Richard E. Gardiner, is awarded a judgment for attorney fees against the
Defendant, Nels Anderson, in the amount of $2,598.75.
ii. This judgment is to be paid by July 9, 2017 (30 days from the June 9, 2017

hearing).
iii. And it is further ordered that this judgment shall be augmented in the amount of
post-judgment interest pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-4, and reasonable
costs and attorney fees expended in collecting said judgment by execution or
otherwise as shall be established.
IV. Regarding Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendant's Response Supporting the Supplemental
Authority:
a. THE COURT FINDS: On May 5, 2017, the Defendant filed a document entitled
Supp]emental New Case Law (the first document). On May 9, 2017, Plaintiff filed his
response (the second document). Then, on May 25, 2017, the Defendant file his

July 07, 2017 05:01 PM
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Response Supporting the Supplemental Authority (the third document). Utah R. Civ. P.
7(i) allows for the filing of a "notice', (first document) of supplemental authority, and

4v

then for any other party to file a "response', (second document). The Rule does not allow
for the filing of a third document. Therefore, the Defendant's Response violated the rule.
b. Accordingly, THE COURT ORDERS:
i. Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendant's Response Supporting the Supplemental

Authority is GRANTED.
ii. Defendant's Response Supporting the Supplemental Authority filed on May 25,

2017, is stricken and shall not be considered by the Court.
*****END OF ORDER*****

Approved as to Fonn:

Isl Todd F. Anderson
Todd Anderson, attorney for Plaintiff

Marlin J. Grant, attorney for Defendant
NOT approved as to form by.Marlin J Grant. Proposed order was served on Mr. Grant on June 28,
2017. No objection had been filed as of July 6, 2017.
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